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ABSTRACT
Defining the limits of biotechnology patents is one of the most
Herculean tasks patent communities are faced with today. The topic
was discussed by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the
National Academy of Sciences in their recent reports. Up to now, no
coherent system has been developed that gives enough-but not
too-much patent protection for DNA-related subject matter. This
article analyzes the problem of patent breadth in the biotechnological
field and outlines how to craft balanced patent protection for
biotechnology inventions. Within the recommended system
innovators would be rewarded adequately, but innovation would still
be allowed without considerable delay and prohibitive costs. Based on
a comparison of U.S. and European biotechnology patent law, the
article first advocates for broad patent protection on DNA-related
subject matter to create sufficient incentives for initial innovators to
invest in costly biotechnological research. To simultaneously spur
subsequent research, the article further proposes the introduction of a
widespread compulsory licensing system on reasonable terms as a
t The author received a J.D. and a Ph.D. in law from the University of Konstanz,
Germany, as well as a Master of Law (LL.M.) from the University of California, Berkeley,
Boalt Hall (School of Law). The author's dissertation, published in Germany in March 2004,
addressed biotechnology law and is entitled Risk Management in Gene Technology Law-Do
Administrative Authorities Have a Margin of Appreciation Concerning Gene Technology
Matters?
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counterbalance. Thereby, the article opts for a compulsory licensing
system that uses arbitration as an enforcement tool rather than
traditional regulatory enforcement by the government. Arbitration is
favored because it allows reconciliation of compulsory licensing with
the principles of free trade. Moreover, arbitration makes compulsory
licensing responsive to the peculiarities of the biotechnological area,
which so strongly depends on patent protection.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1944, Oswald T. Avery discovered that DNA represented the
building blocks of life.' This was the cornerstone for further
groundbreaking inventions in biotechnology. Based on Avery's
results, in 1974, Stanley Cohen and Frederick Boyer achieved the
systematic modification of genes.2 Biotechnology as a new science
was born.3
In 1975, the German Federal Supreme Court (BGH) held that
discovered microorganisms could be patented.4 In 1976, the U.K.
Court of Appeals similarly allowed a patent claiming the cultivation
of mutant strains of bacteria.5 In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court
explicitly clarified that genetically altered micro-organisms are
patentable subject matter.6 These decisions paved the way for the
economic growth of the biotechnology industry. In the 1990s, the
European Patent Office (EPO), United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO), and the Japan Patent Office (JPO) started to grant
patents on genes, and gene sequences. Thousands of patents were
issued. Not everyone, however, was pleased with these pro-patent
developments. Rather, a storm of critical debates arose among
researchers and society at large.7
Since the early days of biotechnology patent law, the patent
community has been strongly pressured to define the limits of patent
rights. 8  On the one hand, speculative "reach-through claims" 9 and
1. ROLF KNiPPERS, MOLEKULARE GENETIK 9 (8th ed. 2001).
2. ROLF D. SCHMID, BIOTECHNOLOGIE UIND GENTECHNIK Rdn. 2,4 (2002).
3. For a brief overview about the history of biotechnology, see David E. Huizenga,
Comment, Protein Variants: A Study on the Differing Standards for Biotechnology Patents in
the United States and Europe, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 629,632-41 (1999).
4. BUNDESGERICHTSHOF [BGH] GRUR 430, 432 (1975) -Baeckerhefe.
5. Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Berk Pharm. Ltd., [1976] R.P.C. 231 (Ch. 1976).
6. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
7. See Andrea D. Brashear, Evolving Biotechnology Patent Laws in the United States
and Europe: Are They Inhibiting Disease Research?, 12 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 183, 191
(2001); Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the
United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and Fair-Use
Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1624-26 (2001); Janice McCoy, Patenting Life in the
European Community: The Proposed Directive on the Legal Protection for Biotechnological
Inventions, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 501,502 (1993).
8. See Kevin J. Dunleavy & Milan M. Vinnola, E. U. Biotech Directive Departs from
US. Practices, NAT'L L.J., May 24, 1999, at C 1-13, available at LexisNexis (last visited Apr.
30, 2004).
9. A "speculative claim" is also sometimes called a "reach-through" claim. See
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, JAPAN PATENT
2004]
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"absolute" overly broad claims that cover a wide range of uses
10
cannot be allowed. This would occur at the expense of further
research, and therefore undermine public policy. On the other hand,
fairly broad patents are necessary1 t in order to adequately reimburse
patentees because research and development costs are high, especially
in the pharmaceutical industry. This dilemma is one of the most
Herculean tasks patent communities are faced with today. And, it
must be overcome if biotechnological research is to be further
stimulated and society is to benefit at large.
This article will explore how to tailor a balanced patent system
that allows follow-on research, research subsequent to the patenting
of an invention, and downstream use of patent inventions without
considerable delay or prohibitive costs, but simultaneously rewards
innovators with adequate patent protection. In Part II, some brief
background information is presented about biotechnology, and the
problems and needs of patenting. Subsequently, Part III will discuss
patent breadth that rewards patentees sufficiently. The proper design
of access rights- as a counterbalance for patent protection-will be
taken up in Parts IV and V.
The analysis centers on two of the world's most important sets of
patent laws, that of the U.S. and Europe. U.S. courts have tried to
strike a balance between sufficient patent protection and the
availability of an invention for subsequent innovators by involving
policy issues in the tests of whether patentability standards-namely
the utility, the enablement, and the written description requirements-
are fulfilled. Recent U.S. case law, however, suggests that courts have
gone too far by overly increasing the standard of patentability, and
thus narrowing patent scope.' 2  The USPTO adopted courts' high
OFFICE, TRILATERAL PROJECT B3B, MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IN SEARCH AND EXAMINATION,
REPORT ON COMPARATIVE STUDY ON BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT PRACTICES, THEME:
COMPARATIVE STUDY ON "REACH-THROUGH CLAIMS" (Nov. 2001) [hereinafter TRILATERAL
PROJECT B3B), available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/tws/report/B3b-reportpdf/B3b-reachthrough-text.pdf
(last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
10. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF PATENTING DNA: A DISCUSSION
PAPER 24 (July 20, 2002), available at
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/publications/pp_0000000014.asp (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
11. See E. Richard Gold, Finding Common Cause in the Patent Debate, 18 NATURE 1217
(2000); cf. Joint Statement to Ensure that Discoveries from the Human Genome are Used to
Advance Human Health (Mar. 14, 2000), at
http://www.patent.gov.uk/about/ippd/notices/genome.htm (last updated Aug. 7, 2002) (Posting
of a joing statement made by U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Bill Clinton).
12. See infra Part III; see also Huizenga, supra note 3, at 654, 673, 684.
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standards and refined its guidelines in 2001. The shift toward
narrowing biotechnology patents could have a chilling effect on the
U.S. biotechnology industry in the long run. Until now, the U.S. has
been the world leader in biotechnology, 3 but the European Union is
catching up. With respect to the number of biotechnology firms, the
European Union has already overtaken the United States.14 In 1998,
the European Union promulgated Directive 98/44/EG on the Legal
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (the Directive) to ascertain
that biotechnology inventions receive adequate patent protection.
15
The requirements to obtain patent protection are strict, and thus
resemble those in the United States, but the applied standard is more
favorable for patentees.
Access rights are also approached differently in both
jurisdictions. Whereas American law focuses on narrowly defined
research exemptions, European patent regulations, such as the
Directive, and patent laws of European Union (E.U.) Member States,
such as the German patent law (PatG)16 and the Commission Proposal
for a Regulation on the Community Patent,' 7 rely in large part upon
statutory compulsory licenses of reasonable terms, which are granted
either by courts or agencies. The comparative analysis of both laws
will establish that statutory compulsory licensing has the prospect to
guarantee proper access to patented inventions without cutting
incentives for companies to invest in biotechnological research.1
8
Yet, it will be shown that current compulsory licensing systems must
be modified in order to be fully successful. In particular, the
following questions must be addressed. How can compulsory
licensing be reconciled with a legal and economic system that
13. David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, Patenting Living Matter in the European
Community: Detriment of the Draft Directive, 16 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 990, 1011 (1992-1993).
14. Development and Consequences of Patent Right in the Field of Biotechnology and
Genetics: Report from the Commission to the European Council, COM (2002) 545 final at 34;
see also infra Part 11 (discussing growing investments in the field of biotechnology in Europe
and discussing the increasing number of patent applications).
15. Council Directive 98/44/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13 [hereinafter the Directive].
16. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie ueber den rechtlichen Schutz
biotechnologischer Erfindungen, v. 15.10.2003 (Bundestags-Drucksache [BT-Drs.] 15/1709 S.
6) [hereinafter German Draft to Implement the Directive] (mentioning the first reading (of three)
held in the Bundestag [German Parliament] on March 11, 2004).
17. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent, COM
(2000) 412 final [hereinafter Proposal for a Regulation on the Community Patent].
18. See also Jerzy Koopman, The Patentability of Transgenic Animals in the United
States of America and the European Union: A Proposal for Harmonization, 13 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 103, 199 (2002).
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strongly relies on the principle of free trade? What uses are eligible
for a compulsory license? What processes must be completed in
order to obtain a license? How should a 'reasonable' license fee be
determined and imposed? The European propositions will be the
starting point for the discussion of these questions. The conclusion
drawn from the discussion will finally lead to the proposal of an
optimal compulsory licensing scheme. An arbitration-based
widespread compulsory licensing scheme is optimal because it is
based upon reasonable terms that depart from traditional systems,
which rely not upon regulatory interventions to authorize licenses, but
upon arbitration as a contract-like resolution scheme.
II. PATENTS ON BIOTECHNOLOGY INVENTIONS-IMPORTANCE AND
POLICY CONCERNS
Patents on DNA-related inventions are particularly favored by
the biotechnology industry. 19 Yet, subsequent innovators allege that
biotechnology patents will have a negative impact on research and
development. The debate is ongoing. Any attempt to redesign the
patent system in the field of biotechnology must consider these
assertions carefully because the interests of researchers and the
industry lie at the core of sophisticated patent legislation. Therefore,
this part of the article will discuss the promises and fears of patenting
more extensively, including pro- and anti-patent positions taken by
scientists, economists and lawyers. The following brief scientific
summary about biotechnology inventions and their prospects shall
further the understanding of the problems underlying the discussion.
A. Biotechnology and Its Inventions
1. Biotechnology and Its Usefulness
Biotechnology is defined as "any technique that uses living
organisms or substances from those organisms to make or modify a
product, to improve plants or animals, or to develop microorganisms
for specific uses."'20 DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid), which is the
genetic material of all living organisms, is isolated, modified, and
19. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information
Dissemination: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM
L. REv. 477,479 (2004).
20. See, e.g., Jasemine Chambers, Patent Eligibility of Biotechnological Inventions in the
United States, Europe, and Japan: How Much Patent Policy is Public Policy?, 34 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REv. 223 (2002) (citations omitted).
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transformed into other organisms to carry out a desired function. A
protein made by one specific organism can be produced in another.
This method has revolutionized ways to treat and study human
diseases. Human insulin, for example, can be produced in bacteria
Escherichia coli in large masses.2 1  Plant-made pharmaceuticals can
be made more efficiently using corn, potatoes, and rice.22 Enzymes
and antibodies whose natural occurrence is too short for treatment of
diseases can be manufactured in the blood or milk of animals through
"gene-farming." Furthermore, DNA sequences function as drug
testing targets in diagnostic tests to identify drug activity. 3 Modified
DNA can be utilized to "knock out" "sick" genes that are responsible
for disease.24 Through such genetic research, the gene responsible for
Alzheimer's disease may be found. Or, the HIV virus, the most
significant threat of this century, may be conquered.25 Additionally,
biotechnology allows for the decreasing of pollution and more
economical cultivation methods. Crops can be made resistant to
26disease, drought, insects, and herbicides. Moreover, better industrial
products, and enhanced food with higher nutritive values can be
designed.27
2. What Are Biotechnology Inventions?
Biotechnology inventions are DNA related inventions. The term
"genomic-type inventions" is also used.28 A classic biotechnology
invention is the isolated and purified full-length DNA sequence and
the protein it encodes. Further typical examples include the
following:
29
21. See SANDRA SCHMIEDER, RISIKOENTSCHEIDUNGEN IM GENTECHNIKRECHT-
BEURTEILUNGSSPIELRAUEME DER VERWALTUNG GEGENUEBER DEN GERICHTEN [RISK
MANAGEMENT IN GENE TECHNOLOGY LAW-Do ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES HAVE A
MARGIN OF APPRECIATION CONCERNING GENE TECHNOLOGY MATTERS?] 40 (2004).
22. MECHTHILD REGENASS-KLOTZ, GRUNDZUEGE DER GENTECHNIK [THE BASICS OF
GENETECHNOLOGY) 94 (2d ed. 2000); see also Charlie Goodyear, Modified Rice Won't be
Planted -For Now, S. F. CHRONICLE, Apr. 10, 2004, at Al and A10.
23. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at xi-xii, 47-49.
24. See Schmeider, supra note 2 1, at 26 n.6.
25. Scalise & Nugent, supra note 13, at 994.
26. Id. at 995.
27. See Chambers, supra note 20, at 223-24.
28. Robert Blackburn, Research Tools in the Biotechnology Industry and the Hatch-
Waxman Act, 7 CASRIP SYMPOSIUM PUBLICATION SERIES (July 28, 2002), at
http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/Symposiuni/Number7/Pub7Contents.htm (last visited
Sept. 24, 2004).
29. For more examples of the forms in which genes or DNA sequences appear in patent
claims, see NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at 25.
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" recombinant (genetically modified) DNA, like genomic DNA 30
coding for a gene, or a fragment thereof;
" mRNA (messenger RNA) which transports the genetic
information encoded in the DNA to the ribosome where the
gene is expressed into a protein;
31
" cDNA (complementary DNA), that is genomic DNA without
introns matching the sequence of the mRNA and synthesized
thereof,32 which provides the exact construction plan of the
expressed protein;
* homologues, or equivalents of DNA, that is similar gene
sequences of the same species or among different species;
33
" proteins expressed by recombinant DNA, comprising the
variants, or analogues thereof, that is proteins that are
slightly altered from their natural protein counterpart, but
function normally the same way as the natural protein;
34
* genetically modified organisms as such, for example, a
genetically modified bacteria;
" processes and tools that have been used to modify and express
DNA, like PCR (polymerase chain reaction) for generating
unlimited copies of any fragment of DNA,35 vectors which
are used as "gene ferries" to introduce modified DNA in
target organisms, or genomic regulatory sequences as
fragments of genomic DNA which are required to regulate
gene expression;
" ESTs (expressed sequences tags), that is short sections of
cDNA, where location in the genome and nucleotide
30. A gene is commonly defined as the entire nucleic acid sequence necessary for the
synthesis of a functional polypeptide. As such, a gene may include more than the nucleotides
encoding the amino acid sequence of a protein, referred to as the coding region. Genomic (or
chromosomal) DNA is double-stranded and consists of interspersed coding and non-coding
regions on both strands. Vertebrate genomes contain many sequences that do not code for
proteins and do not have any known any structural or regulatory function. Less than 5 percent
of the genomic DNA in humans is thought to encode proteins. See HARVEY LOD[SH ET AL.,
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 9.1-9.2 (W. H. Freeman & Co. et al. eds., 4th ed. 2000
(1986), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books.
31. Ribonucleic acid is defined as "[a] single stranded nucleic acid molecule comprising a
linear chain made from four bases (A, C, G and U)." NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra
note 10, at 92.
32. Id. at89.
33. Id. at 90.
34. Huizenga, supra note 3, at 630.
35. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at 4 n.4.
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sequences are known 36 and can then be used to find the
corresponding full-length cDNA, which makes them a tool
in the discovery of new human genes, mapping of the human
genome, and identification of coding regions in genomic
sequences;
37
* as well as SNPs (single nucleotide polymorphism) or DNA
sequence variations that occur when a single nucleotide in
the genome sequence is altered, and that are useful for future
studies of the genome.38
3. Why Are Patents on Biotechnology Inventions So
Contentiously Discussed?
DNA related inventions may appear in patent claims as a product
claim (product patent), as a means to achieve a specific purpose (use
patent), or as a process of making a recombinant product (process
patent), which may also cover the recombinant (product product-by-
process patent).39 Patent protection may be sought, for example, for a
recombinant protein that provides therapeutic use in cancer treatment.
Product protection gives a patent holder an "absolute" right that
covers all uses of a compound. It follows that the patentee could
claim her recombinant protein as an all-embracing, generically
applicable therapeutic protein, which might also be useful to treat
other diseases.4 °  If subsequent researchers specified later, for
example, that the protein is applicable for the treatment of HIV, the
patentee could then enjoin those researchers from using "her" protein.
A use patent, on the contrary, would restrict the use of the patent for
the protein to the specific use as a cancer drug.41 In this case the
patentee would have no comparable "reach-through-right". Whether
the patentee thus receives merely a use patent or a further reaching
product patent that covers "future uses" makes an enormous
difference. Similarly, whether the patent covers variants of the
protein is of significance, even if only one example is disclosed in the
specification. From a scientific standpoint one may argue that the
36. Id.
37. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at 89-90. See also Denis
Schertenleib, The Patentability and Protection of DNA-Based Inventions in the EPO and the
European Union, 25 (3) E.I.P.R. 125, 128 (2003) (noting that ESTs cannot be used to make the
protein associated with the gene).
38. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at 92.
39. Id. at 24.
40. German Draft to Implement the Directive, supra note 16, at 11.
41. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at 24.
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patentee claimed a "general principle." The relationship of the
protein with other compounds might therefore be predictable for a
person skilled in the art such that the patent for the protein should not
be strictly limited to just one use. One could allege that it was the
patentee who achieved the key accomplishment. The patentee
brought into practice the invention upon which others can now
"easily" build. On the other hand, should the patentee really receive
broad protection for all intrinsic uses and variants or would this have
detrimental effects on competition and follow-on research? The
claimed protein, and its encoding DNA sequence, might be of use as a
"research tool" in a wide range of situations. The term "research
tool" is broadly defined, including cell lines, animal models,
combinatorial chemistry libraries, drugs and drug targets-including
drug testing methods that go into clinical trial, cloning tools (such as
PCR), genomic type databases, ESTs and SNPs.42 It embraces all
probable uses in scientific research, such as the use of DNA
sequences to produce new drugs, to discover and to study the function
of genes, to explore further diseases, or to clone DNA fragments with
PCR.43 In fact, any biotechnology invention can be a research tool.
The availability of a research tool can have enormous impact on the
success of a future research project. In the worst instance, non-
availability can compel researchers to refrain from a research project.
Non-availability can result in interminable, and costly, but useless
research efforts. For example, one company had worked more than
ten years on the development of a drug against a specific disease.
Only after entering into a license agreement with a firm that
possessed lead compounds could the company pursue its research
successfully. 44  This shows the immense dependency of
biotechnological research on the availability of DNA-related
inventions. Not only does traditional academic upstream research
strongly need access to biotechnology inventions, but so does
commercial downstream end-product development. These needs
make DNA-related inventions unique. Thus, the topic of patenting
42. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, note 10, at 47; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH (NIH), WORKING GROUP ON
RESEARCH TOOLS, Appendix B (June 4, 1998), at
http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/appendb.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2004).
43. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at 47; see also Michael J.
Stimson, Damages for Infringement of Research Tool Patents: The Reasonableness of Reach
Through Royalties, 2003 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2003), at
http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/03_STLR-3 (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
44. Blackburn, supra note 28, at 28.
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such inventions has become one of the most contentious topics in
patent law. The problem of patenting biotechnology inventions is
amplified by the difficulty of an exact prediction of the uses of DNA
related inventions, and their relationship with other compounds.
B. Importance of Strong Biotechnology Patents
Biotechnology is playing an increasingly important role in a
broad range of industries, particularly in the pharmaceutical
industry.45  Today, almost every drug is produced by using
biotechnological procedures.46 Biotechnology has grown into a multi-
billion dollar industry.47  In the last decades, biotechnology has
stimulated the creation and growth of small businesses, and has
generated new jobs. In 2000, more than 150,000 people were
employed in the U.S. biotechnology industry and around ten billion
dollars were spent on research and development.
48
Biotechnological inventions require high-risk investment in
long-term projects. 49  The development of a new drug costs
approximately $800 million.50  Similarly, one biotechonology
company spent $900 million to create a more durable and productive
maize hybrid and $600 million to develop a soybean variety.51
Investments in DNA sequencing in both the public and private sectors
are substantial. One sequencing machine, for example, cost
$300,000.52 These investments are only profitable with adequate
45. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PATENTS AND
INNOVATION: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES 5 (Mar. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/12/24508541 .pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2004); McCoy, supra
note 7, at 505.
46. Verband Forschender Arzneimittelhersteller e.V. [German Association of Research-
Based Pharmaceutical Companies], Stellungnahme zum Regierungsentwurfvom 25.06.2003fuer
ein Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie ueber den rechtlichen Schutz biotechnologischer
Erfindungen [Written Comments on the German Draft to implement the Directive] (EG-
Biopatentrichtlinie 98/44/EG) (Oct. 20, 2003), at
http://www.vfa.de/de/presse/vfastellungnahmen/regentbiopatentrichtl.html (last visited Apr.
30, 2004).
47. See Development and Consequences of Patent Right in the Field of Biotechnology
and Genetics: Report from the Commission to the European Council, supra note 14, at 34.
48. Chambers, supra note 20, at 223.
49. See e.g., McCoy, supra note 7, at 507.
50. See Cornelia Yzer, Wer Innovationen will, muss Patentschutz sichern, (Mar. 11,
2004), at http://www.vfa.de/de/presse/pressemitteilungen/pm_004_2004.html (last visited at
Apr. 30, 2004). Ms. Yzer is the CEO of the German Association of Research-Based
Pharmaceutical Companies.
51. Scalise & Nugent, supra note 13, at 997.
52. Gitter, supra note 7, at 1677 n.358.
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legal protection.53 Thus, whether the biotechnological revolution
continues strongly "depends on how well the fruits of the revolution
are protected.,
54
Patent rights are a key instrument in protecting investments in
biotechnology. 55  Especially in the pharmaceutical field, where
innovation costs are very high, patent protection is considered
incredibly important.56 Rivalry for a patent may cause inventors to
race to duplicate research and to make costly "design-arounds." But,
rivalry means competition, which benefits consumers through the
development of new and better products. 57  Thus, "design-arounds"
may ensure that patented inventions are more fruitfully employed.
5 8
Based on traditional patent theories that take a utilitarian
incentive approach, it is argued by many that without exclusive patent
protection inventors are unlikely to invest in research.59 Similarly, it
is contended that a strict application of patenting requirements will
lead to excessively narrow claims. Such patents are worthless
because infringement of narrow claims can easily be circumvented by
53. Directive, supra note 15, at 13, Recital 2 and 3; Li WESTERLUND, BIOTECH PATENTS:
EQUIVALENCY AND EXCLUSIONS UNDER EUROPEAN AND U.S. PATENT LAW 10 (2002); Rebecca
S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value of DNA Sequences,
49 EMORY L.J. 783, 794-95, 798 (2000) (arguing against storing information in databases, but
instead advocating for patents on DNA sequences, since storing DNA in databases requires less
financial effort).
54. Chambers, supra note 20, at 224; see also SVEN J.R. BOSTYN, ENABLING
BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 28-29, 61 (2001).
55. See Akim F. Czmus, Biotechnology Protection in Japan, the European Community,
and the United States, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 435,462 (1994); Benjamin D. Enerson, Note,
Protecting Society from Patently Offensive Inventions: The Risk of Reviving the Moral Utility
Doctrine, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 715 (2004); F. Scott Kief, Property Rights and Property
Rules Jbr Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 724-26 (2001); M.H.M.
Schellekens & J.E.J. Prins, Regulatory Aspects of Genomics, Genetics and Biotechnology: An
Orientation on the Positions of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, 7 ELEC. J.
COMP. L. 1, 10 (2003), at http://www.ejcl.org.
56. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 45,
at 22.
57. Cf Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1083 (1989).
58. Victor Song, DNA Sequences as Unpatentable Subject Matter (April 13, 2001),
available at http://Jeda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/380/Song.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
59. See Schellekens & Prins, supra note 55, at 10; see also Scalise & Nugent, supra note
13, at 997; ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TURNING
SCIENCE INTO BUSINESS, PATENTING AND LICENSING AT PUBLIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS
14 (May 27, 2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/24/30634128.pdf (last visited
Apr. 30, 2004).
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designing around them with minor modifications. 60  This leads to
free-riding which denies patentees a fair return.6' Thus, it is of great
concern in the biotechnology industry that the scope of biotechnology
patents extends not only to DNA encoding proteins, DNA itself, gene
sequences, and parts thereof, but also to analogues, or variants of the
claimed invention. 62  The industry does not demand overly broad
patent protection based on speculative claims, but rather an "absolute"
protection for DNA and proteins that covers variants and related
uses.6 3 Given such protection, patents are regarded as valuable assets
that can be exploited through licensing and by excluding others within
specific markets.64
The critical role the patent system plays is reflected in the
number of biotechnology patent applications. Biotechnology patent
applications increased to 47,473 in 2002 from 18,695 in 1996 (a
154% increase).65 Patent protection is especially important for small
biotechnology companies. Such companies rely heavily on
intellectual property, which may be their only product.66  Patent
protection is particularly desirable for start-up companies, since it is
often necessary to attract venture capitalists. 67  But, university
research also depends heavily on patents to fund expensive research
68projects.
The potential to protect an invention in its entire breadth
encourages disclosure so that others can build upon it.69  Without
60. William Sekyi, A Comparative Analysis of Enablement in the United Kingdom and
the United States Based on Amgen Litigations, 4 BIO-SCIENCE L. REv. 148 (2000-2001).
61. Donna M. Gitter, Led Astray by the Moral Compass: Incorporating Morality into
European Union Biotechnology Patent Law, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (2001).
62. Cf Sekyi, supra note 60, at 148.
63. German Association of Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies, supra note 46, at
5-6.
64. Cf Michael North, The U.S. Expansion of Patentable Subject Matter: Creating a
Competitive Advantage for Foreign Multinational Companies?, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 111, 112
(2000).
65. Business Intelligent Unit, Thomson Scientific, US Patent Office Proposes Revised
Strategic Plan (July 2003), available at
http://thomsonscientific.com/ipmatters/patof/8197414/ipmatters-uspto.pdf (last visited Sept. 30,
2004).
66. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at 14.
67. Chambers, supra note 20, at 224; see also Gitter, supra note 61, at 8.
68. Annette Kleiser, Building Economy Through Technology Transfer: University of
Washington Start-ups, 7 CASRIP SYMPOSIUM PUBLICATION SERIES 129 (July 2002), available
at http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/Symposium/Number7/Pub7Contents.html (last visited
Sept. 24, 2004).
69. Chambers, supra note 20, at 225; see also Scalise & Nugent, supra note 13, at 997.
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sufficient patent protection, competitors could use the invention for
free, and inventors would keep their knowledge a secret by invoking
the trade secrets doctrine. This could severely injure the progress of
science which strongly relies on former research results. If the
incentives of patent protection had not been available in the past, a
wide range of important drugs-such as recombinant interferon that is
applied in the treatment of cancer, hepatitis and multiple sclerosis-
would not be on the market today. Especially in disease research,
disclosure is of core importance for the public benefit, since only
20,000 of the 30,000 diseases which currently exist are fully
understood. Therefore, the creation of new pharmaceutical products
will continue by encouraging disclosure in return for adequate
protection against free-riding.
C. Concerns that Exist as to (Broad) Patents on Biotechnology
Inventions
Many have challenged the concept that patent protection is
indeed the best system to spur innovation. Scientists, jurists, and
politicians have raised policy concerns and illustrated the pitfalls of
patenting.70 Genome scientists from around the world demanded that
the results of the Human Genome Project be put into the public
domain, so that they are accessible to all.7' Similarly, the National
Institute of Health (NIH) promotes free dissemination of research
tools. 72  The opinion that basic DNA-related inventions should be
"open sourced" is supported by legal articles demanding that genes,
ESTs and research tools shall be banned from patentability through
stringent application of the concepts of novelty, usefulness, and
nonobviousness.73  DNA sequences should be "open science,"
publicly available in huge databases.74  A network between
researchers should be created to give access to sequencing data like
70. See, e.g., Jon F. Merz et al., Diganostic Testing Fails the Test: The Pitfalls of Patents
are Illustrated by The Case of Haemochromatosis, 415 NATURE 577 (2002).
71. See, e.g., Bruce Alberts & Sir Aron Klug, The Human Genome Itself Must Be Freely
Available to All Humankind, 404 NATURE 325 (2000).
72. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, supra note 42, at Executive Summary.
73. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material
3, 51 (Univ. of Chicago, John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 152 (2d. series) rev.
March 2003), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=317101 (last
visited at Apr. 30, 2004); Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of
Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REv. 1219, 1239 (2004); see also
Schertenleib, supra note 37, at 137.
74. Stephen M. Maurer, New Institutions for Doing Science: From Databases to Open
Source Biology 3, 15 (2003) (unpublished paper, on file with the author).
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those of the Human Genome Project. 7 In the pharmaceutical industry
64 76
open source" should similarly govern. It is argued that creating
open source models would reduce transaction costs, avoid blocking
situations, and help in finding cures for Third World diseases.77
Less radical positions do not want to abolish patenting for DNA-
related subject matter altogether. The advantages of patenting are
admitted in general, but significant changes within the patent system
are necessary to ensure further innovation. Tighter standards of
patentability to narrow the reach of biotechnology patents 78 and
broadened research exemptions are mostly advocated for in this
regard.79 Some have also proposed the creation of non-exclusive sui
generis protection for biotechnology inventions that allows
independent development, 80  or the introduction of compulsory
licensing schemes--either widespread 81 or in emergency cases.
82
Others call for a combination of stricter standards and governmental
licensing controls,83 as well as for interim patents on research tools,
which would be awarded exclusively only for a set amount of time.84
The Report of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics is one of the most
75. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Open Source Genomics, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 254 (2002);
see also J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for
Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 315 (2003).
76. Neil B. Niman & Brian T. Kench, Open Source in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 2003
PROCEEDINGS OF THE MIDWEST BUSINESS ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION (Univ. of Southern
Indiana), 2003 at 127-31, at
http://business.usi.edu/mbea/2003/WordFiles/NIMAN-KENCH.doc (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
77. See Maurer, supra note 74, at 15.
78. See, e.g., Matthew Erramouspe, Staking Patent Claims on the Human Blueprint:
Rewards and Rent-Dissipating Races, 43 UCLA L. REV. 961,998 (1996); Melissa E. Horn, DNA
Patenting and Access to Healthcare: Achieving the Balance Among Competing Interests, 50
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 253, 281-82 (2002-2003); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On
Limiting or Encouraging Rivalry in Technical Progress: The Effect of Patent Scope Decisions,
25 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1,21-22 (1994); see also Schertenleib supra note 37, at 137.
79. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 1074-78; see also discussion infra Part IV.B.
and accompanying notes.
80. See PHILIPPE G. DUCOR, PATENTING THE RECOMBINANT PRODUCTS OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND OTHER MOLECULES 143-50 (1998); see also John S. Leibovitz, Inventing
a Nonexclusive Patent System, Il1 YALE L.J. 2251,2268-72, 2282-83.
81. See, e.g., Gitter, supra note 7, at 1679-84 and infra Part IV.B., B.4.
82. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Patent Law--Balancing Profit Maximization and Public
Access to Technology, 4 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1,49, 51 (2002).
83. See, e.g., Laurie L. Hill, The Race to Patent the Genome: Free Riders, Hold Ups, and
the Future of Medical Breakthroughs, 11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 221,257 (2003).
84. See Margaret Llewelyn, Industrial Applicability/Utility and Genetic Engineering:
Current Practices in Europe and the United States, 16 (11) E.I.P.R. 473,480 (1994).
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comprehensive studies on the issue.85  The Council repeatedly
emphasizes that patentability of DNA-related inventions must be
"treated with great caution." 86 In general, the Council recommends
stringent application of patenting requirements concerning DNA-
related subject matter. Patents for diagnostic tests that are based on
DNA sequences should become a rare exemption, and, where granted,
87limited to a specific use. Patents on research tools should not be
issued at all.88 Patents on gene therapy methods "should seldom be
permissible." 89 Rights over DNA sequences should extend only to the
encoded protein and not to any variants.90 If patents are already
granted, patent holders ought to be required by the government or
courts to authorize compulsory licenses to ensure broad availability
on reasonable terms.91  For non-commercial research, already
patented DNA sequences should even be made freely available.92
Some argue that biotechnology patents that cover a wide scope
of innovation, rather than just a sole invention, may have negative
consequences. It is of huge concern that broad patents on DNA
sequences, without a full understanding of their utility, will result in
strong market monopolies. 93 It is said that the freedom of scientific
inquiry is at stake when a patent is granted for a material that is
needed for further research.94 One who owns a broad patent directed
to a gene, or the code for a therapeutic protein, would be given
commercial control over all future experimentations related to the
patented invention. One would thus have the title to enjoin any
subsequent innovator from access to the tools needed for future
research.95 A patent holder could "come and say: 'Hey, you can't be
85. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg &
Robert P. Merges, Reply to Comments on the Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated with
the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 61-63 (1995).
86. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at xi.
87. Id. at xi, 54, 64.
88. Id. at xii.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 54-56, 60.
92. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at 61.
93. Christopher Anderson, US Patent Application Stirs Up Gene Hunters, 353 NATURE
485 (1991); see also Alberts & Klug, supra note 71, at 325.
94. Brashear, supra note 3, at 215.
95. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 839, 882-83, 907 (1990); Schellekens & Prins, supra note 55, at
10; Schertenleib, supra note 37, at 137.
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working on that gene. That's mine.' ' ' 96 This scenario is not merely
hypothetical. In the case of Myriad Genetics, researchers conducting
genetic tests linked to breast cancer were barred from performing
diagnostic tests because Myriad did not license the patent for one
particular gene that was necessary to conduct such tests.
97
Furthermore, it is argued that vague patents on the discovery of
gene fragments would be unfair, as they would allow patent holders to
cover products that would be later invented, although they have
contributed little to those inventions.98
Moreover, there is a strong fear that exorbitant royalties in
licensing cases may outweigh the social benefits of patents on
biotechnology inventions. This concern has been particularly
addressed by Professors Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg
in their article "The Tragedy of the Anticommons." 99 The authors
contend that a proliferation of intellectual property rights may be
economically and socially costly. Upstream patent rights may be
stifling life-saving innovations further downstream in the course of
research and product development.'00 Patent stacking is regarded as
particularly problematic. 01 Further research, especially downstream
development of end products, may be covered by multiple patents,
each of which would give rise to prohibitive royalty payments. 0 2 The
prospect that one licensed gene fragment turns out to be linked to
subsequent licensed genes might decrease interest in investing
millions of dollars in research. 0 3 Fundamental research that is still in
its early stages, like the understanding of the human genome, could be
96. Martin Enserink, Patent Office May Raise the Bar on Gene Claims, 287 SCIENCE
1196, 1197 (2000) (quoting a statement of Maria Freire, Director of the Office of Technology
Transfer at the National Institute of Health).
97. Gitter, supra note 7, at 1650; John Murray, Note, Owning Genes: Disputes Involving
DNA Sequence Patents, 75 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 231, 234-35 (1999); NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at 39-40, 48. For case studies, see NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at 41-42
98. See Janice McCoy, supra note 7, at 531; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson,
supra note 95, at 884.
99. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). The title "Tragedy of the
Anticommons" stems from another article by Michael A. Heller, in which he analyzes the
general disadvantages of privatization. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REv. 621 (1998).
100. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 698.
101. Id.; see also NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at 71.
102. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at 59.
103. Anderson, supra note 93, at 485.
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severely hampered. 10 4 Further, healthcare might suffer since patents
directed to research tools may significantly limit the possibilities of
downstream analysis and diagnosis because of unreasonable licensing
fees. t °5 Obviously, this would not "serve society well.,
106
Besides, some assert that patenting prevents researchers from
sharing their data. 10 7 Researchers of the Human Genome Project, for
example, stopped exchanging results after patent applications for
human gene fragments were filed. 10 8 Concealment of fundamental
data could stifle pharmaceutical companies seeking to develop new
drugs. Thus, it is not only in the interest of public health, but also in
the interest of the biotechnology industry to make basic research
publicly available. To support this opinion, attention should be drawn
to examples like Merck or the SNP consortium. The SNP consortium
was founded by a group of pharmaceutical companies to publicize
information about SNPs, l09 though, admittedly, only after the
Wellcome Trust of London (the largest nonprofit medical research
foundation in the world) had agreed to provide half of the funding."10
Merck had provided information regarding a sponsored EST
identification project to the public domain because it hoped to use
subsequent research results on "their" ESTs in the production of new
pharmaceutical products."'
D. Consensus: Broad Patents and Broad Access Rights
To summarize, opinions about patenting in the field of
biotechnology are mixed. Patent protection for biotechnology
inventions is both promising and risky. 1 2 There is strong support for
the contention that further investments in costly research are unlikely
without patent protection to provide an incentive." 13 The success of
104. See Alberts & Klug, supra note 71, at 325.
105. See Christine Sevilla et al., The Impact of Gene Patents on the Cost-Effective
Delivery of Care; The Case of BRCA I Genetic Testing, 19 INT'L J. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT IN
HEALTH CARE 287,296 (2003); see also Merz et al., supra note 70, at 577.
106. Alberts & Klug, supra note 7 1, at 325.
107. See, e.g., Merz et al., supra note 70, at 579.
108. Gitter, supra note 7, at 1672.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1672 n.323.
111. Id. at 1672.
112. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 698; see also Fed. Trade Comm'n, To
Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy, at Ch. 4,
p.25 (Comm. Print 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/I0/innovationrpt.pdf.
113. See infra Part lI.B. and accompanying notes.
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the biotechnology industry, up until now, is the best evidence for this
finding. Until recently, investors have poured vast amounts of money
into the biotechnology industry. Yet, how long this will last without
sufficient legal protection is questionable. Conversely, broad patents
may create monopolies with anticompetitive effects. Research and
healthcare could be adversely affected as licensing fights result in
extensive and costly legal debates. According to a recent report by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), a breakdown of biotechnological research must not be
feared due to patenting.)' a  Rather, "patenting is doing what it is
intended to do," fostering innovation.'1 5  A committee with the
National Academies that is studying the impact of research tool
patents was similarly unable to find any slowing effect on research.16
But recent case studies have revealed that biotechnological research
and access to healthcare has been hindered by patents on DNA
sequences. 117  According to a report by the National Academy of
Sciences, intellectual property is managed very successfully, but
research has been slowed and even blocked in the case of diagnostic
tests.' 18
Given this set of powerful, but rivaling facts and arguments, a no
pass-fail decision between pro-patent and non-patent theories should
be made.119 In particular, abolishing patenting of DNA sequences and
genes could lead to undesired and irreversible results on innovation if
the function of new technology markets remains unclear 120 and if the
shortcomings of patenting biotechnology are not overcome.'12 Hence,
114. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 45,
at 13, 22; see also NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at 59; John P. Walsh et
al., Research Tool Patenting and Licensing and Biomedical Innovation in PATENTS IN THE
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (W.M. Cohen & S. Merrill eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at
13-39, 49) (February 21, 2003), available at http://sippi.aaas.org/utt/WalshetalAAAS.pdf (last
visited at Apr. 30, 2004) (concluding that concerns about the proliferation of IP are considered
to be manageable).
115. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note
45, at 13, 22.
116. See Blackburn, supra note 28, at 29.
117. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at 50-51, 58; see also Merz et al,
supra note 70, at 578-79.
118. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 2 1s
r CENTURY, 1,
73, available at http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
119. But see Epstein, supra note 73, at 11.
120. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 45,
at 16-17.
121. See Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 794-95; Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the
Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1,70 (1992).
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it appears that, in the best interest of researchers, the industry and
society at large should generally respect the merits of patenting; yet,
they should also cautiously consider the shortcomings of patenting. A
middle course that reconciles both theories in a fairly balanced patent
system should be advocated. Such a patent system must achieve a
combination of high quality, broad patent protection to create enough
ex ante incentives for research investment and to allow sufficient
access rights to biotechnological inventions that ensure prospering
follow-on research.
122
III. PATENTABILITY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY INVENTIONS IN U.S. AND
EUROPEAN PATENT LAW
Both the United States and Europe allow patents on
biotechnology inventions. Patenting standards are similar.'23 The
determining criteria in U.S. patent law is whether an invention is new,
useful, and nonobvious. 24 Further, the invention must be sufficiently
enabled and described so that it may be reproduced by a person of
ordinary skill in the art. 2 5 Moreover, the patentee must suggest the
best mode for his or her invention. 126 European patent laws do not
explicitly require a best mode requirement. Apart from that, patenting
standards are similar. The pertinent provisions, set forth in the
European Patent Convention (EPC), the E.U. Biotechnology
Directive, and national patent laws, grant a patent when an invention
is new, susceptible to industrial application, involves an inventive
step, and when sufficient information to enable the invention is
disclosed during patent prosecution. 2 7 The European inventive step
requirement corresponds to nonobviousness under U.S. law, and the
industrial application standard to the utility requirement. In each
122. Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 1066; see also NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra
note 10, at 15.
123. BOSTYN, supra note 54, at 87; see also Dunleavy & Vinnola, supra note 8.
124. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2004).
125. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2004).
126. Id.
127. See European Patent Convention, Article 52 EPC (general provision), 54 EPC
(novelty), 56 EPC (involving an inventive step, considered as non-obvious to a person skilled in
the art), 57 EPC (industrial application), 83 (disclosure of the invention in manner so that the
invention can be carried out by a person skilled in the art), available at http://www.european-
patent-office.org (last visited at Apr. 30, 2004); Directive, supra note 15, 1998 O.J. (L 213) at
18; see e.g., Patentgesetz (PatG) [German Patent Act) § I (general provision), § 3 (novelty), § 4
(inventive step), § 6 (industrial application), § 34(4) (enabling disclosure), available at
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/GESAMT-index.html (last visited at Apr. 30, 2004).
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jurisdiction, the enabling disclosure requirement is relevant to the
scope of patent protection.128
In both European and U.S. patent law it has long been
recognized that genetically altered living organisms are patentable
subject matter.129 DNA sequences, genes, proteins and peptides, have
been found to be patentable under the same principles that apply to
chemical inventions.' 30  Biotechnology inventions have been held to
be new, although DNA occurs in nature. In both jurisdictions it has
been argued that the concept of nature does not generally exclude
patent protection because isolated and purified DNA sequences have
been made available to others and, thus, must be distinguished from
their existence in nature. 131  Nonobviousness has also been
continuously re-affirmed. 132  Nonetheless, technology has advanced
and made it easier to enable inventions with computerized probing
methods and automated sequencing machines. Enablement and
written description were held to be satisfied when the description of
the invention allowed a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and
use the invention without undue experimentation. 133
Despite these similarities,' 34 courts in the United States and
Europe have arrived at different conclusions regarding biotechnology
patents. 135 Amgen v. Chugai Pharmaceutical clearly illustrates this
point. The claims at issue concerned analogues of genetically
modified DNA of erythropoietin (EPO), a protein that stimulates the
production of red blood cells. The Federal Circuit held Amgen's
patent invalid for lack of enablement. The court reasoned that Amgen
was unable to properly specify, nor could they show analogues had
128. BOSTYN, supra note 54, at 10.
129. Infra Part 1. and accompanying notes.
130. See Gitter, supra note 7, at 1649-51, 1673-77 (providing a good overview about case
law and policy arguments with regard to patentability requirements in both jurisdictions).
131. Amgen v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("novelpurified
and isolated sequence which codes for EPO"); Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Transkaryotic Therapies
Inc. [2003] R.P.C. 3, 54 (U.K. C.A.); Howard Florey/Relaxin (1995) E.P.O.R. 541, 546-47
(Opposition Div.); Corte di Cassazione [Italy], GRUR Int. 2003, 652.
132. See, e.g., Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1207-09; Biogen/Alpha-lnterferon II, (1995) E.P.O.R.
69, 81 (Technical Board of Appeal); R. v. Eli Lilly/Naphthyl compounds, T278/00 (2004)
E.P.O.R. 13, 79 (requiring an exact reference in the prior art to find an invention obvious).
133. See, e.g., R. v. Mass. Inst. of Tech./Biopolymers, T639/95 (1998) E.P.O.R. 16, 146,
(Technical Board of Appeal); see also Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1212.
134. See TRILATERAL PROJECT B3B, supra note 9, at C12.
135. Koopman, supra note 18, at 188-89, 198; see alsoWESTERLUND, supra note 53, at
93-94 (stating that utility under U.S. law is interpreted more strictly); Huizenga, supra note 3, at
684.
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the biological properties of the claimed DNA. 136  According to the
court, the art was too unpredictable to grant a broad patent that would
encompass all variants encoding EPO. 137  The Patents Court of
England, on the contrary, allowed Amgen to claim the variants.
138
Although the evidence revealed that there were literally millions of
different variants that make up EPO, the Court concluded that it was
possible to perform the invention with routine methods in its full
breadth. 39  The court acknowledged that Amgen had carved out a
general principle and achieved something that had previously eluded
a number of dedicated, experienced, and well-financed groups of
researchers. 4  To support its findings, the court argued that if a broad
claim extending to protein variants would not be permitted, the patent
would be rendered worthless as others could easily change one or two
DNA sequences encoding the proteins without infringing the
patent. 141  The decision of the Patents Court was affirmed on
appeal.
142
The more liberal, pro-broad patent view of the U.K. courts
suggests a different policy consideration in U.S. and European
biotechnology patent law. In Europe, sufficient reward for the
patentee appears to be more influential than in U.S. patent decisions.
This will be highlighted in the following sections of Part III in a
detailed discussion of current patentability standards in both
jurisdictions.
136. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213-14.
137. Id. at 1214.
138. Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, [2002] R.P.C. I (Ch., U.K. Patents
Court).
139. Id. at 132, 134-35. Judge Neuberger agreed with the opinion of the House of Lords in
Biogen (Biogen Inc. v. Medeva Plc., (1997) R.P.C. I (U.K. H.L.) that care is needed not to stifle
research and healthy competition by allowing the first person who has found a way of achieving
an obviously desirable goal to monopolize every other way of doing so. See id. at 90. He found
no insufficiency, as in Biogen, however, because Amgen had disclosed a general principle, and
not only a specific concept, as in Biogen, where the inventive step was the idea of trying to
express unsequenced eukaryotic DNA in a prokaryotic host. Id. at 52.
140. Kirin-Amgen Inc., [2002] R.P.C. at 133.
141. Id. at 138.
142. See Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Transkaryotic Therapies Inc., [2003] R.P.C. 3, 86 (U.K.
C.A.) ("[Judge Neuberger] was right to conclude that the specification disclosed a principle
capable of general application. It follows that Amgen was entitled to a claim in correspondingly
general terms. To obtain the grant of the patent Amgen did not need to show that they had
proved its application in every individual instance.").
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A. Patentability of Biotechnology Inventions in the U.S.
1. Utility, 35 U.S.C. § 102
In U.S. patent law, utility has become a significant hurdle to
overcome in seeking patent protection for biotechnology
inventions. 143  With its new utility guidelines issued in 2001, the
USPTO continues to fight "throw away" patents with no specific use.
The 2001 guidelines have been referred to as a "180 degree turn"
from the agency's previous policies. 44 Now, applicants are presented
with a much more rigorous test for showing that an invention has
utility. The old test, used by USPTO examiners until 1998, only
required that the invention be both "specific" and "credible." Under
the new guidelines, the test is three-pronged: Applicants must
credibly demonstrate that (1) the product or process has specific
utility to the subject matter claimed, (2) the utility has a real world
use, and is not merely a research implement for further research, and
(3) that the utility is "substantial"--defined in the new guidelines as
"both a therapeutic method of treating a known or newly discovered
disease and an assay method for identifying compounds that
themselves have a substantial utility."' 145  The practical use
requirement may exacerbate the receipt of broad protection for DNA-
related inventions under the 2001 guidelines. It is more likely that a
use patent will be issued that is limited to the function of the claimed
DNA sequence or protein set forth in the specification.1 46  As a
consequence, many claims to research tool, such as ESTs, which have
broad applications "for therapeutic use," are most likely rejected147
although the USPTO has not explicitly declared ESTs unpatentable.1
48
143. John Richards, United States Patent Law and Practice with Special Reference to the
Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries § 3 (2002), available at
http://www.ladas.com/Patents/BiotechnologyUSPharmPatentLaw/USPhar04.html (last visited
Apr. 30, 2004).
144. See Utility Requirement in PTO Guidelines May Cause Problems for Biomedical
Researchers, 33 FASEB NEWSLETTER (Dec. 2000), available at
http://www.faseb.org/opa/newsletter/12x00/utility.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2004) (referencing
the statement of John Doll, director ofa PTO group that reviews gene patent claims).
145. This test is distinguishable from the European law requirement, which does not
require a showing of practical use. See WESTERLUND, supra note 53, at 89.
146. See also Mary Breen Smith, End to Gene Patents? The Human Genome Project
Versus the United States Patent and Trademark Office's 1999 Utility Guidelines, 73 U. COLO. L.
REv. 747, 777-78 (2002).
147. Utility Requirement in PTO Guidelines May Cause Problems for Biomedical
Researchers, supra note 144.
148. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1094 (Jan. 5, 2001).
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2. Nonobviousness, 35 U.S.C. § 103
Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, a patent claim is obvious "if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art." 149  Generally, the nonobviousness
requirement is not a barrier to the receipt of a patent.' 50 This has been
criticized because new technology and more detailed understanding
have made the isolation and manufacture of DNA sequences more
straightforward.' 5' It seems that the Federal Circuit has now
responded to this criticism, at least in part. In a case in the area of
research tools, the Federal Circuit indicated that the Court may
tighten its currently forgiving nonobviousness standard. 152 The claim
at issue in SIBIA Neurosciences v. Cadus Pharmaceutical Corp.
concerned an invention directed to a cell-based screening method
useful for the identification of compounds that exhibit agonist and
antagonist activity. 53 Within the prior art, the claimed method was
recognized as an improvement because it allowed a scientist to
rapidly and reliably screen large numbers of compounds for agonist
and antagonist activity.154 Despite this secondary consideration, the
Federal Circuit held the invention obvious because, in principle, the
utility of reporter gene constructs in drug screening methods was
already known. 155  The consequences of this decision on the
nonobviousness standard are not yet clear. One might presume,
however, that the Federal Circuit may resort to increasing the
nonobviousness standard in order to narrow the scope of research tool
patents. 156 In particular, screening methods and expression techniques
might be declared obvious in fiture cases. The decision in Velander
149. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2004).
150. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
151. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1677 (2003).
152. SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1355-59 (Fed. Cir.
2000). The district court had decided that the claim was not sufficiently enabled for all cells, but
limited to eukaryotic ones. This was not further discussed on appeal as the Federal Circuit
focused on nonobviousness. Id. at 1355.
153. Id.
154. Cf id. at 1352.
155. Id. at 1357.
156. See BOSTYN, supra note 54, at 142 (asserting that the future of DNA sequences
patents is rather uncertain because of the advancement of the technology).
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v. Garner also supports this trend.1 57 In Velander, the claim before
the court concerned transgenic animals that produce human
fibrinogen (an enzyme that plays a key role in blood clotting) in their
milk. The expression of the enzymes had been sufficiently
demonstrated in cell culture. 158  However, it remained unclear
whether the production of enzymes in animal milk was obvious in the
view of persons skilled in the art. Rather, the evidence supported
"several reasonable but contradictory conclusions.' 59 Nevertheless,
the Federal Circuit granted broad deference to the Board's decision
and found the claim invalid on grounds of obviousness. Again, this
reasoning suggests a shift toward a heightened nonobviousness
standard for all biotechnology inventions. But, the tone of the
decision indicates that the nonobviousness requirement could become
a barrier that is difficult to overcome in the context of screening,
cloning and expression methods.
3. Enabling, 35 U.S.C. § 112
To be enabling, a patent specification must teach those skilled in
the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention
without undue experimentation. Whether claims are sufficiently
enabled is thus determined retrospectively, by looking back to the
time of the filing of the patent application. 160  This was declared
repeatedly by the Federal Circuit.' 61 In determining whether
experimentation is undue, the Federal Circuit looks at the quantity of
experimentation necessary, the nature of the invention, the state of the
prior art, and the breadth of the claims. 162 Both the Federal Circuit
and the USPTO strongly rely on the presence of working examples,
although working examples are not an absolute requirement to show
enablement. 163  In Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, the Federal
Circuit held a chemical patent invalid for lack of enabling disclosure
because the specification did not disclose a specific starting
material 64 The key question to resolve in order to determine whether
157. Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
158. Id. at 1364.
159. Id. at 1378.
160. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
161. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1234
(Fed. Cir. 2003); Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Amgen v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
162. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
163. See Richards, supra note 143, § 4.4.
164. Genentech, Inc., 108 F.3d at 1366.
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the specification was enabling, was the predictability of the art at the
time the invention was made and reduced to practice. Uncertainty
leads to an invalid or a narrower patent. The fact that biotechnology
is an unpredictable art 165 is routinely used as a justification by courts
for requiring a heightened enablement standard for biotechnology
inventions. 166
4. Written Description, 35 U.S.C. § 112
In addition to the enablement standard, written description has
become a major barrier for receiving broad patent protection for
biotechnology inventions. The written description standard requires
sufficient disclosure in the claims and in the specification to inform a
person having ordinary skill in the art that the applicant was truly in
possession of the claimed invention at the time the application was
filed. The written description standard has been clarified in detail by
the Federal Circuit. The requirement had been used to strictly limit
the breadth of initially filed biotechnology patents where there was no
precise description of the invention. In Fiers v. Revel 167 the Federal
Circuit demanded that the DNA itself be described. The statement
that DNA is part of the invention together with reference to a
potential method for isolating the DNA was seen as a mere research
plan. 168 In Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and
Co.,169 the Federal Circuit narrowed the scope of a patent claim to
vertebrate and mammalian cDNA encoding insulin, which comprised
human cDNA. The court held that description of DNA "'requires a
precise definition, such as by structure, formula, [or] chemical name"'
of the entire invention.1 70 Thus, merely describing the cDNA of rat
insulin was insufficient to result in patent protection of the entire class
of vertebrate and mammalian insulin. 71 Similarly, the Federal Circuit
concluded in In re Vaeck that a claim to a chimeric gene stated to be
"capable of being expressed in cyanobacteria cells" was not properly
supported by a specification that showed utility in only a few
cyanobacteria. Rather, the Court required additional illustrative
165. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
166. Huizenga, supra note 3, at 663.
167. 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
168. Id. at 1170.
169. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
170. Id. at 1568.
171. id.; see also SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 255 F.3d 1349, 1354
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (narrowing the scope of a claim because the description discloses only how to
practice the invention using mammalian cells).
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description to make the workability of the invention more
predictable. 172
Critics have commented on the strict written description
requirements set by the Federal Circuit. In particular, systematic
arguments were raised against written description as an additional
patentability standard. 173 The Federal Circuit has not adhered to these
contentions. 174  In contrast, the Court confirmed its jurisprudence
recently in University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co. 175 Here, the
Court explicitly held that written description is a separate
requirement, which goes beyond the enablement standard. 76  The
Court again explained that it is not sufficient for the patentee to
merely show what a composition does; rather, the patentee must fully
set forth the claimed invention with specific reference, including
words, structures, figure, diagrams, formulas, etc.'
77
The USPTO guidelines, as revised in 2001, carry forth the
Federal Circuit's written description standard. A patentee is obliged
to precisely explain the mode of operation or principle whenever
applicable. 178  The training materials in the guidelines indicate that
claims to "isolated nucleic acid that specifically hybridizes under
highly stringent conditions to the complement of the sequence" will
only be regarded as having sufficient support if a specific utility is
described for the DNA. 179  For example, DNA must code for a
protein, which has credible, substantial, and specific utility. If the
function is defined too broadly, or the invention is directed to
something specific that is not adequately described, the training
172. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
173. Particularly, it is contended that written description can only be an issue when subject
matter is subsequently claimed after the patent was granted, but not when initial claims are at
stake. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc. (Enzo II), 323 F.3d 956, 979 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (Rader, Gajarsa & Linn, JJ., dissenting); Harris A. Pitlick, The Mutation on the
Description Requirement Gene, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 209, 223 (1998).
174. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem (Enzo I1), 323 F.3d at 974-75; see also Richards, supra note
143, § 4.1. For a recent compilation of the written description jurisprudence of the Federal
Circuit see also Joseph M. Manak, The Law of Written Description in Pharmaceutical and
Biotechnology Patents, 23 BIOTECH. L. REP. 30 (2004).
175. 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
176. Id. at 920-21.
177. See, e.g., Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Enzo
Biochem (Enzo II), 323 F.3d at 969; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. V. Eli Lilly and Co., 119 F.3d
1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
178. 37 C.F.R. § 1.7 1(a)-(b) (2004).
179. Revised Interim Written Description Guidelines Training Materials, Synopsis of
Application of Written Description Guidelines 35, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/written.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
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materials recommend that claims be rejected.' 80 Claims to allelic
variants that do not specify the nature of the variation are likely to be
refuted on the grounds that the art is unpredictable.18' If one cannot
show that he has all parts of his invention, variants and related uses,
"in his hands," only a narrow patent that is strictly limited to the
disclosed variants and uses will be granted. 182 Receiving broad patent
protection for DNA related subject matter is thus increasingly
unlikely in the U.S. due to the heightened written description
standard, both in litigation, and during patent prosecution.
183
5. Possible Impacts of the U.S. Patentability Standards
The shift in U.S. patent law to narrow patents may create
problems in the future. 8 4 In particular, the rigorous enablement and
written description standards may worry inventors since a patent that
does not cover an entire family of variants and related uses is
arguably not broad enough to recoup research and development
costs. 185  This may result in fewer investments in costly research.
Small startups in particular may face the problem of trying to attract
sufficient venture capital when their sole asset is a narrow patent.
8 6
One might presume that it is only a matter of time before the effects
of the strict enablement and written description standards take effect.
Since the "level of knowledge in the art" in biotechnology will
increase in the future, the standard for enablement and written
description will decrease correspondingly.' 8 7  The Federal Circuit's
view of biotechnology as an unpredictable art suggests that high
patentability standards for enablement and disclosure will persist,
180. See, e.g., id. at 30-32.
181. Id. at 41-46.
182. Burk & Lemley, supra note 151, at 1679; see also Linda R. Judge, Biotechnology:
Highlights of the Science and Law Shaping the Industry, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 79, 86-91 (2003).
183. Cf. Development and Consequences of Patent Right in the Field of Biotechnology
and Genetics, supra note 14, at 47 (referring to the discussion on the OECD workshop "Genetic
Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices" on January 24 and 25, 2002 at
Berlin).
184. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 151, at 1679.
185. Id. at 1679-80; see also Eli A. Loots, The 2001 USPTO Written Description
Guidelines and Gene Claims, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 137 (2002) (fearing disincentives
for investments).
186. See supra note 112, at Ch. 4, p.2 5 (referring to opinions of panelists).
187. Margaret Sampson, Comment, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written
Description Requirements Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1223, 1267, 1274 (2000).
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regardless of the progress in the art.188 Narrow patents are thus very
likely to remain an issue in the biotechnology context. If investments
in biotechnology are to be encouraged, though, there must be a
change in the Federal Circuit's and USPTO's patent policy with
respect to biotechnology, and, specifically with regard to enablement
and written description. 189
B. Patentability of Biotechnology Inventions in Europe
1. The European Patent System
European biotechnology patent law is strongly influenced by the
decisions of national patent courts, and by the decisions of the
European Patent Office (EPO). The European patent system currently
provides two forms of patents, and a third is being drafted. Presently,
a patentee can apply for a national patent in one Member State that
grants protection in its respective country. Beyond that, the European
Patent Convention (EPC) offers the possibility of a European patent
issued by the EPO. The European patent is advantageous in that it
awards the patentee a bundle of national patent rights with only one
application. However, the European patent grants no uniform
protection within Europe. Since the EPC is exclusively a patent
registration system,' 90 enforcement of the European patent depends
entirely upon the patent laws of the contracting states.' 9' A
Community patent that provides unified patent protection is currently
being discussed within the E.U., 192 but it is unlikely that it will be
enforced before 2005. 193
188. Where the art indeed changed significantly so that an invention will sustain
assessment of enablement and written description, the Federal Circuit and USPTO may then rely
on nonobviousness to deny broad patent claims.
189. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 151, at 1680-83.
190. Scalise & Nugent, supra note 13, at 1016.
191. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 20, at 236-7.
192. The Community patent will neither replace the European patent, nor national patents.
Rather Community patent law will coexist with national patent laws and the European patent
system. A patentee has to elect which protection he wants. See Proposal for a Regulation on the
Community Patent, supra note 17, at 18-19.
193. The Irish Presidency which will last until the first term of 2004 intends to bring the
matter before the European Council to finalize the Regulation. See Press Release, Industrial
Property: Commission Proposes Establishing Community Patent Court (Feb. 2, 2004), available
at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p action.gettxt-gt&doc=IP/04/137101RAPID&lg
=EN (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
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This inconsistent legal framework was of particular concern in
the field of biotechnology because patentability of genes has been
contentiously discussed among Member States. France, for example,
had declared that it would not allow "commercialization of the human
body., 194  The E.U. Council reacted. Legislation concerning
biotechnology patents was introduced to provide a harmonized
standard of patent protection for biotechnology inventions for all E.U.
Member States.19 5  As a result, the Biotechnology Directive,
98/44/EC, 196 was promulgated in 1998.
E.U. Member States had to adjust their national patent laws
accordingly. The EPO had no obligation to follow the Directive since
it is not an institution of the E.U. Nevertheless, the Administrative
Council of the European Patent Organization amended Rule 23 of the
Implementing Regulations of the EPC on June 16, 1999, and brought
the EPC in line with the Directive.1 97 Additionally, the Commission
of the European Communities proposed that the Community patent
adopt the Directive's standards as part of current European patent
law. 198 This ensured that the Directive's uniform standard will still be
applied after the Regulation on the Community patent becomes
effective.
The Directive's aim to harmonize European law is apparent in
Recitals 5 and 6.199 The Directive is clearly committed to patenting
biotechnology inventions. Ethical concerns other than those
explicitly mentioned in the Directive (Article 4 and Article 6) shall
neither be used to reject biotechnology patents nor to limit their
scope. The Directive's pro-patent view often goes unnoticed in
international patent literature. In many cases, the Directive is
discussed as additional proof that European law grants lesser patent
protection for biotechnology inventions than U.S. law does. 00
194. Biotechnology: Community Law Takes Precedence Over National Law, EUR. REP.,
June 21, 2000, available at LEXIS, European News Sources File (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
195. Directive, supra note 15, at 13, Recitals 1, 5 and 6. For a brief overview of the
Directive, including legislative history and impacts of the Directive see Robin Nott, "You Did
It! ": The European Biotechnology Directive at Last, 20 E.I.P.R. 347, 349 (1998). For a more
detailed description see MATHIAS ZINTLER, DIE BIOTECHNOLOGIERICHTLINIE (2001).
196. Directive, supra note 15.
197. Brashear, supra note 7, at 191.
198. C( Proposal for a Regulation on the Community Patent, supra note 17, at 9.
199. Directive, supra note 15, at 13.
200. Gitter, supra note 61, at 3; Gitter, supra note 7, at 1655-56; see also Schellekens &
Prins, supra note 55, at 19; Chambers, supra note 20, at 236-39, 245-46; North, supra note 64,
at 118, 129, 134; Cynthia M. Ho, Building a Better Mousetrap: Patenting Biotechnology in the
European Community, 3 DUKE J. COMP. INT'L L. 173, 185, 199 (1992); cf Dr. Nick Scott Ram,
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Indeed, Article 4 excludes plants and animal varieties from
patentability. 2 1  Article 6 provides that inventions shall be
unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would be contrary
to ordre public, or morality.20 2 Excluded from patentability are
processes for cloning human beings, processes for modifying the
germ-line of human beings, use of human embryos for industrial
purposes, and processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals
which causes them to suffer. These provisions aim to protect and
preserve human dignity, the rights of disabled persons, animal
welfare, and genetic diversity. In the majority of cases, however,
DNA-related inventions are not affected by these limitations because
they are construed narrowly, allowing for patents on a wide range of
genetically modified organisms, including methods to transform
human, animal, and plant DNA.20 3 The Directive's ethical limitations
are therefore not representative of the overall European approach with
respect to DNA-related subject matter and breadth of biotechnology
patents. Although addressing moral objections are important, the
ethical questions that the Directive addresses are not addressed
herein.20 4
Comparative analysis of patent scope in U.S. and European law
focuses upon European patentability standards in general, and upon
how patent scope is tailored in individual decisions of national patent
courts and the EPO.2 °5 The Directive's relevant provisions, are
Articles 3 and 5, which concern patentability requirements, and
Articles 8 and 9, which are set forth under the title, "Scope of
Protection."
Biotechnology Patenting in Europe-The Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions: Is This the Beginning or the End?, 2 BID-SCIENCE L. REv. 43, 45 (1998).
201. Directive, supra note 15, at 18. For a critical view, see Nott, supra note 195, at 348-
49.
202. Directive, supra note 15, at 18-19.
203. See Howard Florey/Relaxin, 1995 E.P.O.R. 541 (Opposition Div.) (holding patents on
human cDNA and rNA not unethical); R. v. Leland Stanford/Modified Animal, E. (2002)
E.P.O.R. 2, 22 45 (Opposition Div.) (stating patentability of animals); see also McCoy, supra
note 7, at 513.
204. For a good overview of moral issues see Gitter, supra note 61.
205. The Directive followed existing pro-patent policies in Europe. See Ho, supra note
200, at 192. Therefore, patent standards after the Directive cannot be explained by just focusing
on the literal language of the Directive. Rather, prior patent case law of national courts and the
EPO must also be used to carry out the respective law.
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2. Patentability Standards Pursuant to the Biotechnology
Directive
Article 3.1 clarifies that in general, biotechnology inventions are
patentable.20 6  "[I]nventions which are new, which involve an
inventive step and which are susceptible of industrial application shall
be patentable even if they concern a product consisting of or
containing biological material or a process by means of which
biological material is produced, processed or used., 2 7  Article 5.2
addresses gene sequences and partial gene sequences as patentable
subject matter notwithstanding the fact that they occur in nature. The
legislative intent to allow patents on partial gene sequences is
undermined, however, by Recital 22 to the Directive. Recital 22
explicitly emphasizes that "the discussion on the patentability of
sequences or partial sequences of genes is controversial... [but]
according to [the] Directive, the granting of a patent for inventions
which concern such sequences ... should be subject to the same
criteria of patentability as in all other areas of technology." 20 8 As a
result, each sequence is considered individually as patentable
invention, especially in situations where gene patent sequences
overlap in areas not essential to the invention.20 9
a. Utility
Article 3.1 requires that an invention have "industrial
application." Article 5.3 highlights the importance of this criterion
for gene sequences and partial gene sequences. The patentee is
explicitly obliged to disclose the industrial application during the
application process. With this disclosure requirement, the Directive
prevents "naked" DNA sequences, which lack any specification
concerning their use, from being patented.
In the view of the EPO, the concept of industrial application
requires a function which is "more than speculative., 210  A DNA
206. See also EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, Part C, Ch. IV, 2a, Rule 23(b), available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/guilines/pdf/gui_e-full.pdf (last visited Apr. 30,
2004).
207. Directive, supra note 15, at 18-19.
208. Id. at 15.
209. Id., Recital 25.
210. European Patent Office, Official Information, Decisions of the Examining and
Opposition Divisions, l (ii) (June 20, 2001), available at http://www.european-patent-
office.org/news/info/2001_06_20 e.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
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sequence must have a function that is substantial, specific, and
credible.2 1' This three-prong test corresponds to the U.S. utility
standard. However, in contrast to the U.S. utility standard, the EPO
does not demand a*showing of actual use. Rather, the more lenient
standard of indication of potential use is sufficient, as long as the said
use is not merely speculative.212 The patentee can disclose a
sequence's predicted use in further research, for example, as a marker
in tissue and compound testing, as a tool to locate the entire gene, or
as a protein producer.213 Therefore, results of the human genome
project,214 as well as ESTs and SNPs, 2 15 without any actual use are
patentable subject matter, provided their probable industrial
usefulness can be demonstrated in the above manner. SNPs (single-
nucleotide polymorphisms), for example, are patentable when they
are of diagnostic use.216 ESTs can be patented when their function in
automatic sequencing is further specified and is thus non-trivial. 1 7
b. Inventive Step = Nonobviousness
Article 3.1 requires that an invention involve an inventive step.
This criterion complies with the nonobviousness premise in U.S.
patent law. The decisive factor in determining whether there is an
inventive step is the knowledge of those skilled in the art. The
nonobviousness requirement is a significant threshold to overcome in
E.U. biotechnology patent law. Where the solution to a problem is
arbitrary and routine, and where the obtained DNA sequence has no
unexpected advantageous effect, the invention involves no inventive
step.218 This strict nonobviousness standard is especially applied to
ESTs 219 and to genetic engineering methods. With regard to the
211. Id; see also AgrEvo/Triazole Sulphonamides, T939/92 (1996) E.P.O.R. 171, 174,
183 (Technical Board of Appeal).
212. European Patent Office, supra note 210, 9(i).
213. Id.; see also Directive, supra note 15, at 14; EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note
206, at Part 4, Ch. IV, 4.6, Rule 27(l)(O; Andreas Oser, Patenting (Partial) Gene Sequences
Taking Particular Account of the EST issue, 30 IIC 1, 8 (1999).
214. See Gitter, supra note 61, at 14.
215. BOSTYN, supra note 54, at 104-05.
216. See ULRICH THIELE, CRITERIA FOR PATENTS ON GENES - AS VIEWED BY THE EPO,
at 27 (2002), available at
http://www.italy.les-europe.org/docs/thiele.ppt (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
217. Melanie J. Howlett & Andrew F. Christie, An Analysis of the Approach of the
European, Japanese and United States Patent Offices to Patenting Partial DNA Sequences
(ESTs), 34 IIC 581, 596-97 (2003).
218. Id. at 591.
219. Id.
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latter, the European Commission has even indicated that it may
tighten the demands for a showing of nonobviousness. The
Commission stated that patentability may be denied when a gene can
be easily deduced with the help of computer-supported methods.22 ° In
1997, the EPO invalidated a patent directed to the production of the
milk-clotting protein chymosin in E.coli.221  In 1995, the EPO
revoked a patent, arguing that the knowledge with regard to bacteria
was so advanced that one could not receive a patent for the
construction of DNA vectors used to express exogenous genes in
yeast.222
c. Enabling Disclosure and Patent Scope
A finding of enablement demands that the invention can be
reproduced by a person skilled in the art at the time the application is
filed.223 Therefore, sufficient disclosure during patent prosecution is
necessary. Article 5.3 states, in addition, that the specific industrial
application has to be disclosed in the application. 224 This has raised
the question of whether the scope of a DNA sequence patent is bound
to the disclosed use.22 5
To determine the effect of Article 5.3, the provision has to be
read in conjunction with other articles that refer to patent scope,
including the Recitals that point to the legislative intent. The
Directive addresses patent scope under its own heading; Chapter III
includes Article 8 and Article 9.226 These articles state that a patent
directed to a biological composition, on a product containing or
consisting of genetic information, or on a process that enables a
biological material to be produced, shall extend to any material in
which the patented material is contained, or in which the patented
process is performed (Article 8). Article 9 requires that the material
possess the same characteristics and perform the same functions.
At first glance, the term "function" as used in Article 9 may be
understood as proof that a biotechnology patent is limited to the
220. Development and Consequences of Patent Right in the Field of Biotechnology and
Genetics, supra note 14, at 20.
221. Unilever/Chymosin, T386/94 [1997] E.P.O.R. 184, 196 42. (Technical Board of
Appeal); see also Novo Nordisk v. DSM, [2001] R.P.C. 35, 675 (Ch., U.K. Patents Court).
222. Genentech/Expression in Yeast, T455/91 [1996] E.P.O.R. 85, 98 (1996).
223. European Patent Convention, Art. 83, available at http://www.european-patent-
office.org (last visited at Apr. 30, 2004).
224. Directive, supra note 15, at 18.
225. See, e.g., ZINTLER, supra note 195, at 138.
226. Directive, supra note 15, at 19.
SCOPE OF BIOTECH INVENTIONS
disclosed industrial application.227 The German government seems to
have adopted this understanding in its Draft to Implement the
Directive. The reasons behind the Draft are not completely clear,
however.228  Under the proposed legislation, the scope of a
biotechnology patent shall be determined "narrowly and precisely,
strictly coupled to its function" ("enge und praezise
Funktionszuordnung"). 229 From this, it follows that a patent on a gene
sequence could only cover a specified use, for example, the use as a
target in testing for cancer drugs. Consequently, the patent holder
would not be entitled to royalties on inherent uses that are discovered
later, notwithstanding whether these uses are related to his invention.
In the above example, the patentee could not successfully claim the
use of the target in AIDS testing. This narrow view, however, is
inconsistent with the language, structure, and legislative history of the
Directive.
First, there is a literal argument against such narrow
construction. The term "Function," as stated in Article 9, does not
mean "industrial application" as stated in Article 3.1 and Article 5.3.
If the legislature had intended to limit the scope of a patent to the
disclosed use, it could have easily done so by simply using the term
"industrial application" in Article 9. Second, Article 5.3 is not
mentioned in the Chapter concerning patent scope, but rather under
the heading "Patentability." Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the
legislature drafted the disclosure of industrial application requirement
as a limitation of patent scope. Rather, it suggests that the disclosure
requirement was implemented in the Directive as a general
patentability requirement and as a "first" threshold to discourage
227. German Draft to Implement the Directive, supra note 16, at 10-1; cf supra note Tim
Sampson, Rewriting the Genetic Code: The Impact of Novel Nucleotides on Biotechnology
Patents, 24 E.I.P.R. 409, 412 (2002) (criticizing the imprecise language of the Directive which
could also be utilized to unduly narrow patent claims).
228. See German Draft to Implement the Directive, supra note 16, at 18 (stating the
implementations of the Bundesrat [German Senate]); Peter Meier-Beck, Aktuelle Fragen der
Schutzbereichsbestimmung im deutschen und europaeischen Patentrecht [Current Questions of
Determining the Scope of Protection in German and European Patent Law], GRUR 909, 911
n.37 (2003); Uta Koster, Absoluter oder auf die Funktion eingeschraenkter Stoffschutz im
Rahmen von "Biotech "-Erfindungen, insbesondere bei Gen-Patenten [Absolute or Functional
Product Protection of "Biotech "Inventions, Particularly of Patents on Genes], Zeitschrift fuer
Gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecth [GRUR] 833, 837-42 [2002].
229. German Draft to Implement the Directive, supra note 16, at 11; see also Niclas
Kunczik, Die Legitimation des Patentsystems im Lichte biotechnologischer Erfindungen
[Justification of Patenting in the Field of Biotech Inventions], GRUR 845, 849 (2003); Andreas
Schrell, Funktionsgebundener Stoffschutz fur biotechnologische Erfindungen? [Functional
Product Protection for Biotech Inventions?], GRUR 782,784, 786 (2001).
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"throw away patents" in which no use, or only an overly broad one, is
disclosed. 230  Recital 24 undermines the view that industrial
application disclosure criterion and patent breadth are separate
requirements. Recital 24 provides that disclosure is necessary to
comply with the industrial application criterion.231  But, nothing is
mentioned that disclosure limits patent scope. Further, narrowing
patent scope to the disclosed industrial application would eviscerate
Article 9 from its purpose to extend patent protection to all material
that possesses the same characteristics and performs the same
function. This, however, would offend the well settled rule that all
parts of a statute have to be given effect. Lastly, the legislative
history militates against limited patent protection to the disclosed
232industrial application.
The Directive aims to encourage investments in biotechnological
research rather than foreclosing them through narrow DNA patents.
Accordingly, Article 5.3 cannot be read as a provision that limits the
scope of a sequence patent to the disclosed use. In contrast, patent
scope for DNA-related subject matter is still "absolute" under the
Directive. Such absolute protection is unlikely to reach uses outside
the field of the invention, however. Assuming that a researcher later
discovers that an antivirus agent can be used as a pharmaceutical,233
or a pharmaceutical compound as detergent, 234 patent protection will
not extend to these fields of use unless the patentee indicates such use
in the specification. But, "absolute" protection extends to all material
in which the DNA sequence is included, provided the "material...
[has] the same function", as set forth in Article 9.235 This entitles a
230. Research tools, e.g., where only the broad and unspecified use "for medical research"
is given, could be rejected.
231. Directive, supra note 15, at 15.
232. Koster, supra note 228, at 836-37; Lutz van Raden & Dorothea von Renesse,
'Ciberbelohnung"-Anmerkungen zum Stoffschutz fuer biotechnologische Erfindungen ["Over-
Reward"- Remarks to Product Protection for Biotech Inventions], GRUR 393,396 (2002).
233. Id.
234. BENGT DOMEIJ, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS IN EUROPE 101 (2000) (arguing that the
scope of a pharmaceutical patent is limited to pharmaceutical uses).
235. Cf WESTERLUND, supra note 53, at 189-90; Max-Planck-Institut fuer auslaendisches
und intemationales Patent-, Wettbewerbs- und Urheberrecht Munchen [Max-Planck-Institute for
foreign and international patent, competition and copyright law Munich], Taetigkeitsbericht fuer
die Zeit vom 1.1.-31.12.2001 [Activity report for the year 2001], at 29-33 (2002), available at
http://www.ip.mpg.de/Enhanced/Deutsch/jahresbericht.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2004); K.H.
Meyer-Dulheuer, Der Schutzbereich von aufNucleotid- oder Aminosaeuresequenzen gerichteten
biotechnologischen Patenten [Scope of Protection of Nucleotide and Amino Acid Sequence
Patents], GRUR 179, 181-82 (2000); cf Meier-Beck, supra note 228, at 911. Beck seems to
[Vol. 21
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patentee to reap additional advantages related to his invention, which
can be predicted from the framework of the disclosure. Hence, a
patent can be wide reaching, encompassing a group of DNA
sequences, their corresponding mRNA, the proteins they encode,
variants thereof, as well as future sequence variations and uses, as
long as they relate to the commonly disclosed features, functions, and
uses.
236
This understanding of the Directive complies with the guidelines
of the EPO, prior case law of the EPO Board of Appeals and liberal
opinions of national patent courts. The EPO guidelines declare, as a
general rule, that claims are regarded as supported by the description
unless there is a well-founded reason why the invention cannot be
worked through the entire field as claimed within the supporting
description or as known as a matter of general knowledge.237 To be
sufficiently supported, a claim may not be completely unpredictable
or conceptually boundless. As case law provides, a claim can even be
upheld as a sufficiently supported product-by-process claim that is
broad and covers any process to make the product, despite the fact
that the disclosed structure formula is unfounded.238
In addition, the EPO guidelines explicitly allow generalizations
in the area of biotechnology. 23 9 This is especially the case when an
invention defines a completely new field. 240  Exceptions to the
standard that a patentee is principally not entitled to a broad claim
include: (1) where the invention is, from the outset, limited in scope
because the specification refers to a product specifically achieved by
one particular process, 241 (2) where the patentee claims only one use,
even argue for broader protection, going beyond any function; this, however, seems to be
inconsistent with current EPO case law. See infra text below.
236. Cf. BGH GRUR 1987, 794, 795 - Antivirusmittel.
237. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 206, at Part C, Ch. 111, 6.
238. Merck/Chroman derivatives, T552/91 [1995] E.P.O.R. 455, 461-62 T 5.2 (Technical
Board of Appeal).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See Biogen Inc. v. Medeva Plc., [1997] R.P.C. I (H.L.) (requiring the polypeptide to
display HBV antigen specificity-this special feature was not supported by the disclosure); see
also Sekyi, supra note 60, at 154; German Draft to Implement the Directive, supra note 16, at
18 (stating the implementations of the Bundesrat [German Senate]).
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but no general use,242 and (3) where the claim is a so called "Swiss-
type claim" for a new use of a known product.24 3
Applying these doctrines, the EPO Board held in its landmark
decision, GENENTECH/Polypeptide Expression I, that a broad,
generic claim is sufficiently enabled even if it is supported only by the
description of a few variants. 2 " Such a claim may cover unknown
uses, including specific variants which might be provided or invented
in the future.245 It is immaterial when only some variants of the
invention are available.246 The Board stated: "it is a fundamental
principle of patent law that a claim can validly cover broad subject-
matter, even though the description of the relevant patent does not
enable every method of arriving at that subject-matter to be carried
out. ' 247  This pro-broad patent approach has been repeated in
subsequent judgments of the EPO and in decisions of national patent
courts.
"Variations in the starting materials are acceptable as long as
'the claimed process reliably leads to the desired product.' 248 One
member of a class can encompass others, despite the fact that the
class encompasses millions of polynucleotides or polypeptide
sequences. 249  The experimentation required to find these variants
may be time consuming, but a broad claim is justified because the
242. Cf BGH GRUR 1987, 794, 796-97 - Antivirusmittel (regarding chemicals: denying
coverage for the use of the patent to treat other diseases as the specification did not disclose
further applications).
243. See R. v. RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT LEIDEN/Monocotyledonous plants, T612/92
[2002] E.P.O.R. 9, 89 (2002); Monsanto & Co. v. Merck & Co., [2000] R.P.C. 77 (Eng. C.A.
2000); cf Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Baker Norton Pharms. Inc., [2001] R.P.C. 1, 30 1 110
(Eng. C.A. 2001) (claiming second medical use).
244. GENENTECH L/Polypeptide Expression, [1989] E.P.O.R. 1, 5 (Technical Board of
Appeal 1989) ("It was basically enough to show one way of carrying out the invention .... The
method had virtually infinite applicability to provide any polypeptide which is large enough. No
direct utility of the products and intermediates prepared by the invention was required.").
245. Id. at 8; cf also BGH GRUR 1991, 518, 519 - Polyesterfaeden (concerning
chemicals: uses that are later discovered, result in a broadened scope of the patent).
246. GENENTECH I/Polypeptide Expression, [1989] E.P.O.R. at 8; see Kirin-Amgen Inc.
v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, [2002] R.P.C. 1, 165 (Ch., U.K. Patents Court);
WEYERSHAEUSER/Cellulose, T727/95 [2001] E.P.O.R. 35,272 (Technical Board of Appeal);
U.K. Patent Office, Examination Guidelines for Patent Applications Relating to
Biotechnological Inventions in the UK Patent Office (November 2003), 51,
available at-http://www.patent.gov.uk/patent/reference/biotechguide/sufficiency.htm.
247. KIRIN-AMGEN/Erythropoietin II, T636/97 [2000] E.P.O.R. 135, 145 4.5
(Technical Board of Appeal).
248. BIOGEN/Recombinant DNA, T301/87 [1990] E.P.O.R. 190, 201 4.3 (Technical
Board of Appeal).
249. Chiron Corp. v. Murex Diagnostics Ltd., (1996) F.S.R. 153, 183 (Eng. C.A. 1990).
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starting point disclosed by the patentee is "the guide rope of the peak,
the route map to the buried treasure, the key to the castle," which
deserves broad protection. °  If a claim does not cover variants,
modifications and equivalents, but merely refers to the disclosed
examples in the specification, "no dominant patent could exist, and
each developer of a new method of arriving at that subject-matter
would be free [to use] earlier patents. 25' Patent protection would not
be fair.252 Rather, "[iln many cases.., patent protection would...
become illusory.
253
In the Harvard/Onco-Mouse case 254 the EPO Technical Board of
Appeal extended this pro-broad patent approach to inventions
concerning animals. The claim referred to the introduction of an
activated oncogene sequence into the genome of non-human
mammalian. The written description demonstrated that the invention
had only been performed in a murine model. Yet, the Board upheld
the generic claim, concluding that specific claim limitations are not
required unless there is sound opposition toward the scope of the
invention as claimed.255 In stark contrast to the U.S. Federal Circuit
decision in Eli Lilly256 in which the scope of a similar claim was
limited to the disclosed rat DNA, the Board pointed out that "it may
be assumed that the skilled person is aware ... of other suitable
mammals on which the invention can likewise be successfully
performed., 257  Accordingly, the Board saw "no reason why the
application should be refused on the ground that it involves an
extrapolation from mice-as specifically featured in the application-
to mammals in general. 258
The endpoint of broad claiming is reached when the disclosed
use becomes speculative, 259 and the claim turns into an overly broad
250. See Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Roche, Diagnostics GmbH, [2002] R.P.C. 1, 140 (Ch., U.K.
Patents Court).
251. KIRIN-AMGEN/Erythropoietin II, T636/97 [2000] E.P.OR. 135, 145 4.5
(Technical Board of Appeal).
252. DSM/Astaxanthin, T737/96 [2000] E.P.O.R. 557, 64 (Technical Board of Appeal).
253. KIRIN-AMGEN/Erythropoietin II, T636/97 [2000] E.P.O.R. 135, 145 4.5
(Technical Board of Appeal).
254. HARVARD/Onco-Mouse, T19/90 [1990] E.P.O.R. 501 (Technical Board of Appeal).
255. id. at 508 3.5.
256. EliLilly, 119 F.3dat 1559.
257. HARVARD/Onco-Mouse, T19/90 [1990] E.P.O.R. at 509 3.8.
258. Id.; see also R. v. Leland Stanford/Modified Animal, E., [2002] E.P.O.R. 2, 35
(Opposition Div.) (upholding a general claim covering production of other species).
259. European Patent Office, supra note 210, 9(i).
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"reach through" claim lacking any support. For example, it is
insufficient to declare that an invention works in any cell of any gene
under the control of any promoter. This would be a mere "invitation
to perform a research programme,, 261 but not a disclosure that enables
others to perform the invention.
d Assessment of the European Patenting Standard
In reviewing the preceding description of patentability standards
in Europe and in the U.S., one should first note that both laws apply
strict standards in return for a biotechnology patent. Strict standards
ensure high quality patents, which are necessary to make the patent
system reliable, and which guarantee competition. It is apparent,
however, that European law uses a reverse approach to ascertain high
quality patents. Nonobviousness is applied very stringently, while the
criteria of utility and enabling disclosure are construed more in favor
of the patentee. Europe grants patents on neither inventions without
any specific use ("throw-away patents," "Vorratspatente") 262 nor
overbroad "reach through claims," which cover any speculative use of
the invention. Yet, the European industrial applicability requirement
is less demanding than the U.S. utility standard.263 While it is
becoming increasingly unlikely to get a patent directed to research
tools under the recent U.S. standards, the European Biotechnology
Directive has paved the way for patenting research tools that have no
immediate therapeutic use, but which include an inventive step and
which can probably be applied in drug testing for specific diseases, in
gene mapping, or in developing other products. Furthermore,
European law departs from current U.S. law as there is no similar
tendency to rigorously limit patent scope for inventions that involve a
major inventive step by requiring broad and precise disclosure.
Rather, it is sufficient to provide a starting point from which a generic
claim can be made. For example, a less demanding standard may be
260. U.K. Patent Office, supra note 246, at 60.
261. MYCOGEN/Modifying Plant Cells, T694/92 [1998] E.P.O.R. 114, 124, 18.
(Technical Board of Appeal); see also GENENTECH/t-PA, T923192 [1996] E.P.O.R. 275
43(v) (Technical Board of Appeal) ("Not a single example of a functional derivative is provided
in the description of the patent in suit. However, a wealth of possible derivatives are claimed.
This is nothing more than an invitation to carry out a research programme in order to find
suitable derivatives of human t-PA.").
262. German Draft to Implement the Directive, supra note 16, at 17 (stating the
implementations of the Bundesrat [German Senate]).
263. WESTERLUND, supra note 53, at 89.
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permitted to cover variants of the claimed DNA sequence or protein,
and uses that reach beyond those explicitly disclosed.26
The discrepancy between European and American law arises
from the discrepancy in perception of biotechnology within each
system. While uncertainty is generally inherent in the area of
biotechnology, this is used as an argument to narrow patents in the
U.S. Europe does not have an analogous skeptical perception of
biotechnology. Rather, it appears that Europe places biotechnology
on a pedestal, while U.S. patent practice does just the opposite.265
This difference results in variability within the entire field of
biotechnology, 266 giving broader, albeit not unfairly absolute
protection.267 In turn, some argue that this strengthens a patent
holder's exclusive domain since a competitor cannot escape
infringement by just slightly modifying the sequence of a protein.268
Subsequent inventors, on the other hand, are not foreclosed in seeking
patent protection because improvement patents on DNA related
subject matter are still available.269
In some respects, U.S. law can provide patent holders the same
protection, at least for variants, through the doctrine of equivalents in
an infringement suit.270  The doctrine of equivalence, however, is
strongly influenced by the strict enablement and written disclosure
standard. The Federal Circuit has created a biotechnology specific
equivalence standard,271 which requires that patentees can only invoke
the doctrine of equivalence when the asserted claim is enabled and
sufficiently described.272
European law with its higher nonobviousness threshold and more
moderate utility and enabling disclosure standards is best designed to
meet the demands of initial inventors who were the first to make an
invention. European law grants broad patent protection if a
264. Schertenleib, supra note 36, at 128; see also Huizenga, supra note 3, at 650; E.S. VAN
DE GRAAF, PATENT LAW AND MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY 37, 436 (1997).
265. Huizenga, supra note 3, at 668.
266. See also supra note 36, at 128.
267. See WESTERLUND, supra note 53, at 135.
268. Cf Huizenga, supra note 3, at 667.
269. Cf Krster, supra note 228, at 841-42.
270. Sekyi, supra note 60, at 158.
271. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1182 (2002); Michael John Gulliford, Much Ado About Gene Patents: The Role
of Forseeability, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 732-45 (2004) ("biotech-specific, foreseeability-
based limitation on the doctrine of equivalents").
272. Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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significant inventive step deserving of reward can be shown. This
way, European law provides an appropriate legal framework to
encourage research projects, particularly in the pharmaceutical
industry where research is especially expensive.
IV. GIVING ACCESS TO PATENTED INVENTIONS-RESEARCH
EXEMPTIONS AND COMPULSORY LICENSES
Broad patent claims, even when a strict nonobviousness standard
is applied, cannot promote innovation alone. Downstream and
upstream "follow-on" research can still be stifled since patent holders
may exclude subsequent innovators from using the invention or
charging exorbitant royalties after having overcome the strict
patentability standards. 273 This Part will explore how to draft patent
law to prevent such hold-outs and cases of prohibitive royalties.
Some argue that antitrust law already provides appropriate remedies
to counter "hold-ups., 274  The antitrust system, however, is not
designed to function as a permanent license system for biotechnology
patents. This is seen in the recommendations of the FTC in its recent
report on "To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of
Competition and Patent Law and Policy. '275 The FTC recommends
that antitrust law and patent law should work together to fight against
blocking situations. The FTC calls for changes in the patent system,
and cooperation of patent and antitrust institutions to promulgate
policy standards that guarantee competition and innovation. 76
Antitrust law shall play a major role in policy considerations, but the
FTC also depends heavily on patent law to create a balance between
patent protection and competition, rather than on antitrust remedies.277
The proposal that legislatures should change the patent system to
resolve hold-up problems thus is in line with the FTC approach. To
best manage the problem, legislators ought to promulgate explicit
laws that guarantee access to patented biotechnology inventions. To
date, research exceptions and traditional compulsory licensing
provisions are discussed as protective means for follow-on research
within the United States and Europe; Europe has already adopted
273. Gitter, supra note 7, at 1679.
274. Simon Mazzola, Compulsory Licensing of Genome Biotech Patents, 4 INTELL. PROP.
L. BULL. 1 (1999).
275. FED. TRADECOMM'N, supra note 112.
276. Id. at Ch. 5 and 6.
277, A second report by the FTC highlighting how antitrust law should be changed to spur
innovation, is in preparation and forthcoming this year.
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detailed statutory research exemptions and licensing models.278
Research exemptions prevent liability in an infringement action, and
permit research on patented biotechnology inventions free of any
licensing fee. Traditional compulsory licensing compels a patentee to
grant a license on reasonable terms, enforced by governmental
intervention, either by agencies or courts, when a patentee is not
willing to authorize a contractual license.
Neither compulsory licensing provisions nor statutory research
exemptions are unfamiliar topics in modem intellectual property law.
Rather Article 30 and Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement provide for
"limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent" and
"other use without authorization of the right holder."279 In the Doha
Declaration, the WTO affirmed that compulsory licenses are "other
uses" under Article 3 1.280
Not until recently, U.S. scholars argued that a compulsory
licensing system similar to European proposals, coupled with an
experimental use exception, would be an optimal legal framework for
the United States to approach the conflicting interests surrounding
biotechnology inventions. Donna Gitter suggested that Congress
ought to enact a compulsory licensing scheme for commercial
research on DNA sequences requiring payment of "reasonable reach-
through licenses."28' In addition, research exceptions for public-
sector researchers and non-profit researchers should be
promulgated.282 Similarly, Janice Mueller proposed a "liability rule"
model for research tools. In this model non-consensual "development
use" of patented research tools would be permitted, provided that ex
post "reach-through" royalties are paid to the patentee.283 Mueller's
model is based on an earlier proposal of Professor Rebecca Eisenberg,
278. Infra Part IV.B.
279. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I C, art. 30,
31, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/tripse/t agmO e.htm (last visited Apr. 30,
2004).
280. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health,
WT/M1N(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 14, 2001) 5.b., available at
http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/minist-e/min0l-e/mindecl-trips-e.htm (last visited Apr.
30, 2004).
281. Gitter, supra note 7, at 1679-84; see also Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory Patent
Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1304 (2001).
282. Gitter, supra note 7, at 1684-90.
283. Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use
Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 54-66
(2001).
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who had advocated as early as 1989 for expanding the experimental
use doctrine in the area of biotechnology.284 Eisenberg suggested that
the use of a patented invention to verify that the patent is sufficiently
enabled should be altogether exempt from patent infringement.28 5
Use that would lead to improvements in the technological field of the
patent could not be enjoined by the patentee, but the patent holder
would receive an after-the-fact "reasonable royalty" in "some
cases." 286 The National Academy of Sciences also considered some
form of compulsory licensing in its 2004 report, although the
Academy focused on research exemptions in order to ascertain access
to patented inventions.28 7 Based on Eisenberg's "finely tuned
[approach] to the needs of basic research, while preserving the
incentive to innovate in technolog[y] ' ' 288 the Academy presented a
proposal, which has the potential to overcome the difficulty of
Eisenberg's approach. The difficulty in distinguishing between
verification and the use of an invention to make improvements is
avoided and the benefits of Eisenberg's approach are retained. 28 9 The
Academy recommends a broadened research exemption for any use.
The exemption is limited, however, with respect to the commercial
exploitation that one is allowed to make for free. The exemption shall
terminate when the research yields patents that are asserted against
another party, and the exemption should include the condition that the
commercial markets of the patentee are not undermined.2 90 Since the
Academy saw only a small likelihood that Congress will pass
(preferred) research exemption legislation, it alternatively proposed
basing the system on administrative action, which shields only
federally-funded research from liability.291 The Academy suggested
that 28 U.S,C. § 1948(a) be applied as a tool to exempt federally-
funded research from patent infringement, by regarding such research
as conducted on behalf of the United States. 9 2
284. Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 1074-78.
285. Id. at 1078.
286. Id. at 1077-78, 1084. It may be appropriate for a court to require a researcher to pay a
royalty to the patent holder when the patentee because the licensee could successfully "invent
around," the patent. Id.
287. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 118, at 95.
288. Id. at 114.
289. Id. at 92.
290. Id. at 93.
291. Id. at 115.
292. Id. at 116.
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Whether the United States should indeed adopt broad
experimental use legislation and compulsory licensing models similar
to those in European is questionable, however. Legislation for access
to research tools was already considered in 1990, but was passed by
neither house.293 Especially with respect to compulsory licenses, the
opinions are split. Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson have
called compulsory licenses an "anathema., 294  In a 1996 article,
Merges argued that proposals to create more compulsory licensing are
based on a faulty theoretical framework.295 Compulsory licenses are
administrative or legislative liability rules that are inflexible and lead
to legislative "lock-in. 296 Richard Epstein provocatively stated that
"it is a far cry to assume that [compulsory licenses] should be
imposed (as opposed to used) as a general practice in patent law, or
,,297
even that fraction of patent law that is confined to biotechnology.
Granted, traditional compulsory licensing models and research
exceptions involve not only strengths, but significant drawbacks.
This will be explored further in this Part by describing how U.S. and
European patent law approach access rights to biotechnology
inventions, respectively. Considerations regarding how to properly
craft access rights will follow after the assessment of current and
proposed research exemptions and compulsory licensing systems
within the two jurisdictions.
A. Access Rights to Patented Biotechnology Inventions in U.S.
Law
U.S. patent law only recognizes compulsory licensing in the
instance of federally-funded patents.298 The funding agency has the
right to "march-in" 299 and grant a compulsory license, provided that
action is necessary (1) because the patentee has not taken or will not
take effective steps to achieve practical application of the invention,
293. Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 1990, H.R. 5598, 101st
Cong. § 402 (1990).
294. Merges & Nelson, supra note 95, at 911 ("As long as compulsory licensing remains
anathema, the possibility of a "hold up" by the basic patent holder makes reverse equivalents the
best alternative under these circumstances.").
295. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1304-17 (1996).
296. Id. at 1296, 1299.
297. Epstein, supra note 73, at 24.
298. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2004).
299. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE, 2002 CASE AND STATUTORY SUPPLEMENT 87 (2003).
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(2) to alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably
satisfied by the patentee, or (3) to meet requirements for public use.3 ° °
In theory, these provisions apply to many fundamental inventions,
particularly in academic research. The NIH, for example, could thus
"march-in" and make such inventions widely available. But until
now, NIH has not done so. 30' The effectiveness of the Bayh-Dole
Act, which grants sufficient access to publicly funded research, has
been questioned. Additionally, even though the NIH would intervene,
appeals of research institutions would delay access to the desired
invention so that, given the time sensitivity of biotechnological
research, follow-on research projects might be dropped rather than
conducted. °2
In the instance of non-federally-funded research, the government
has no opportunity to order compulsory licenses at all. Provided the
patentee denies a contractual license, the user of a patented invention
can only use the invention lawfully, if one of the exceptions to patent
infringement applies. U.S. law contains a common law research
exception, and a statutory "FDA exception," which allows certain
infringements when they are "solely for purposes reasonably related"
to obtaining FDA approval for a new drug.303  Literally, both
exceptions could be an instrument to allow upstream and downstream
research on patented biotechnology inventions on reasonable terms
for commercial and non-commercial use. However, judicial
precedents have shut the door for such interpretation, as both
exceptions are interpreted narrowly.
With regard to the experimental use exemption, the Federal
Circuit held in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. that
the exemption cannot be understood so broadly as to allow any
violation of the patent laws in the guise of scientific inquiry.30 4 In
Madey v. Duke University, the Court made clear that experimental use
"is very narrow and strictly limited., 305 The defense applies only to
research that is conducted "solely for amusement, to satisfy idle
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry., 30 6 For-profit research
300. Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 203(1)(a)-(b) (2004).
301. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 294 (2003).
302. Id. at 309.
303. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2004).
304. 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
305. 307 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
306. Id. at 1363.
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is not sheltered; rather use is disqualified from the defense if it has the
"'slightest commercial implication.'" 3 7 In Madey, the Federal Circuit
addressed explicitly whether the exemption extends at least to
universities. The result was crushing for academic researchers. The
Court highlighted that many universities are pursuing licensing
programs from which they derive "a not insubstantial revenue
stream., 30 8 Thus, the common law experimental use exemption is not
even a safe harbor for universities.
The "FDA exception" of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) is defined
comparably narrow. 309  The Federal Circuit held in Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA that the requirement, "solely for
uses reasonably related ' 310 to regulatory approval by the FDA, "does
not globally embrace all experimental activity that at some point,
however, attenuated, may lead to an FDA approval process., 311 It
was explicitly stated that "[entire] new drug development activities,"
especially at the early stages, are not covered by the exemption as this
"would effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees owning
biotechnology tool patents. 312
The consequences of this effective elimination of experimental
use exemptions in U.S. law are worrisome, because follow-on
inventions, as well as drug development activities, may be hampered
when access is blocked or only possible in return for exorbitant
royalties.313 The report of the National Academy of Sciences revealed
evidence that already more universities are receiving notices
demanding cessation of use or royalties in the biotechnological field
after the Madey v. Duke decision. 31 4 Under current law, courts could
resolve hold-up problems by not finding infringement based on a
more nuanced analysis of the doctrines of equivalents and reverse
equivalents.315  However, the problem with this proposal is that
307. Id. at 1362 (quoting Roche Prods., Inc., 733 F.2d at 63).
308. Id. at 1363 n.7.
309. For an in-depth-discussion of the current jurisprudence, see Natalie M. Derzko, In
Search of a Compromised Solution to the Problem Arising from Patenting Biomedical Research
Tools, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347, 366-88 (2004).
310. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (emphasis added).
311. Integra Lifesciences 1, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
312. Id.
313. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 118, at 89, 110; Nicholas
Groombridge & Sheryl Calabro, Integra Lifesciences v. Merck-Good for Research or Just
Good for Research Tool Patent Owners?, 22 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 462,471 (2003).
314. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 118, at 88.
315. Merges & Nelson, supra note 78, at 21-22; Merges & Nelson, supra note 95, at 909-
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patentees could not reap the fruits of their investments, damages or
reasonable royalties.3 16  This would have unwanted effects on
investments in biotechnology research. Public "buy-outs" of patents
that are central for the biotechnology industry by the government
317
are also not an appealing solution, given the current budget problems.
The recent proposal of the National Academy of Sciences to
broaden research exemptions also is not appropriate to give sufficient
access to patented biotechnology inventions.318 Setting aside the
constitutional issue, which it raises with its recommendation to create
an administrative research exemption, it inadequately addresses the
problem. As the Academy admits, a significant amount of
fundamental research done in companies would not be covered
pursuant to the Academy's proposal. 319 This could result in the non-
development of cutting edge inventions, with all of the significant
adverse impacts on innovation. Thus, it is necessary that lawmakers
in the United States rethink access rights for commercial and non-
commercial research. 320 To achieve legislation may be difficult. But,
the increasing progress of science and the growing significance of
biotechnology create the need for legislation more apparent than it
was as of 1990, when legislation concerning access rights to research
tools failed.3 2 1  If the United States wants to prevent the major
drawbacks of too little access to patented inventions, new legislation
on access rights should take place disregarding any accompanying
difficulties.
B. Access Rights to Patented Biotechnology Inventions in
Europe-A System to Adopt?
European law contains clearly codified research exemptions to
patent infringement and also compulsory licensing models
independent from government funding. The provisions, provided by
the Directive,32 2 take into account international laws, including the
316. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L.
REv. 1177, 1238 (2000) (arguing that the patentee would be left with nothing).
317. Derzko, supra note 309, at 405.
318. See infra introduction to Part IV. and accompanying notes.
319. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 118, at 95.
320. Cf, e.g., John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE
1021; see also Mueller, supra note 283, at 36-7 (2001); Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 1074-78;
see also text infra Parts IV.B.4., V. and accompanying notes.
321. Patent Competitiveness and Technological Act of 1990, H.R, 5598, 101st Cong. §
402(1990).
322. See Directive, supra note 15, Recital 25.
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German Patent Law (PatG) and the forthcoming Regulation on the
Community Patent. The EPC recognizes compulsory licensing
provisions and exemptions for experimental use that contracting states
have opted to implement in their patent laws. However, because the
EPC does not regulate the enforcement of the European Patent laws, it
requires each contracting state to enforce its own laws.323 Article
27(b) of the European Community Patent Convention of 1975 allows
determination on whether the invention functions as claimed and
whether the invention will work in different conditions, and allows
discovery of unknown features of the patented invention and allows
improvements upon the invention.324
1. The Specific Access Rights in European Patent Law
a. The Directive's Access Provisions
The Directive points to compulsory cross-licensing in Chapter
III. Compulsory cross-licensing is regarded as a means to allow full
exploitation of an invention. Under Article 12, a breeder who cannot
acquire or exploit a plant variety right without infringing a prior
patent may apply for a compulsory license for non-exclusive use of
the invention protected by the patent.325 In return for the license the
licensee has to pay an "appropriate royalty," and has to cross-license
his plant variety on reasonable terms to the patent holder upon
326
request. 6 To be entitled to a compulsory license, the breeder must
demonstrate that (a) he or she was unsuccessful in obtaining a
contractual license from the patentee, and (b) that the plant variety the
compulsory license is sought for, constitutes significant technical
progress of considerable economic interest compared to the invention
claimed in the prior right.327 The authority responsible for granting
the license is designated by each Member State. 328 In addition, use of
biotechnology patents for research purposes related to a patented
invention does not constitute patent infringement.329
323. European Patent Convention, Article 64(1) EPC, available at http://www.european-
patent-office.org (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
324. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 118, at I11.
325. Directive, supra note 15, at 19, art. 12.1.
326. The Directive, supra note 15, at 19.
327. Id. at 19-20, art. 12.3.
328. Id. at 13, 20, art. 12.4.
329. Development and Consequences of Patent Right in the Field of Biotechnology and
Genetics, supra note 14, at 23.
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b. Access Provisions in German Patent Law
In its Draft to transform the Directive in national law, the
German Government strongly favors compulsory licenses and
experimental use provisions to address biotechnology inventions.
According to Sections 1 and of § 24 PatG, the German Patent Court
may grant a compulsory non-exclusive license ("Zwangslizenz") for
commercial uses on reasonable terms when (a) the applicant failed to
obtain a contractual license and (b) the applicant's invention contains
an important technical step of significant economic importance. 330 If
the patentee wants, she can demand a cross-license on reasonable
terms for the invention that is made based on her patent. In the Draft,
the German Government explicitly clarifies that § 24 PatG should
apply to biotechnology inventions. 331  The German Draft thus goes
beyond Article 12 of the Directive which provides compulsory
licenses only for plant patents but not for biotechnology patents in
general.
In addition to its compulsory licensing provisions, the German
Draft allows for access to biotechnology patents by relying on the
traditional experimental research privilege codified in § 11 Nr. 2 PatG
("Forschungsprivileg").33 2  Section 11 Nr. 2 PatG allows the
exploitation of a patent without paying any royalties for experimental
use. The term "experimental use" encompasses any use that aims to
enhance scientific knowledge through the patented invention.
Research on the invention is covered, as well as research that is done
to exploit the invention commercially.33 3 The exception is justified by
the public interest of non-commercial research, and the constitutional
right to do research pursuant to Article 5 Section 3 of the German
Constitution. 3  This is consistent with the patentee's property right.
Property is explicitly protected by Article 14 of the Constitution; but,
pursuant to Article 14 Section 3, an owner has to consider the
330. German Draft to Implement the Directive, supra note 16, at 6.
331. See id. at 13; see also Verband Forschender Arzneimittelhersteller e.V. [German
Association of Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies], supra note 46, at 6-7.
332. German Draft to Implement the Directive, supra note 16, at 8-9.
333. BGH [German Supreme Court] Klinische Versuche GRUR 1996, 109 (113); see also
Heinz Goddar, The Experimental Use Exemption: A European Perspective, 7 CASRIP
SYMPOSIUM PUBLICATION SERIES, 13 (July 2002), available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
334. BVerfG [German Federal Constitutional Court] Klinische Versuche GRUR 2001, 43
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overriding interests of society ("Sozialbindung des Eigentums") in
using the property.335
c. Access Provisions of the Proposal for a Regulation
on the Community Patent
The Proposal for a Regulation on the Community Patent also
contains a statutory license system and experimental use exceptions.
The Proposal's compulsory licensing system is set forth in Article 21
and Article 22.336 The system is designed to provide guarantees
against abuses of the rights conferred by [a] patent., 337 Under Article
21 Nr. 1, the European Commission may grant a compulsory license
to fight defensive patenting when the patent holder refuses to use a
patent longer than three years after the patent was granted. Further,
Article 21 Nr. 2 states that a license shall be authorized when the
"second patent [for which the license is sought] ... involves an
important advance of considerable economic significance in relation
to the invention claimed in the first patent.' 338 The license is limited
to the purpose for which it was authorized, is non-exclusive, and is
non-assignable. 339  The licensee ought to pay the patent holder
"adequate remuneration," taking into account the economic value of
the license and any need to correct an anti-competitive practice.340 In
the case of a dependent patent, the first patent holder shall be entitled
to a cross-license on reasonable terms to use the patented invention
the licensee carries out based on the first patent. 341 The grant of a
license requires that the subsequent innovator has made "efforts to
obtain authorisation from the patent holder on reasonable commercial
terms and conditions, and if such efforts have not been successful
within a reasonable period of time".
342
Article 9(b) provides an experimental use provision. It explicitly
states that "acts done for experimental purposes relating to the
subject-matter of the patented invention" are allowed without having
to pay any royalties.343
335. See German Draft to Implement the Directive, supra note 16, at 11.
336. See Proposal for a Regulation of the Community Patent, supra note 17, at 46-47.
337. Id. at 24.
338. Id. at 47.
339. Id. at 47, art. 21 nr. I(a)-(c).
340. Id. at 48, art. 22 nr.l(f).
341. Id. at 47, art. 21 nr. 2.
342. Id. at 47, art. 22 nr.5.
343. See id at 41.
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2. Disadvantages of the European Experimental Use
Provisions
The experimental use provisions which are provided by German
patent law and the Proposal for a Regulation on the Community
Patent have similar disadvantages to the U.S. experimental use
exceptions. Their scope is interpreted narrowly.344  In the Clinical
Trial decision, the German Constitutional Court (BVerfG)34' affirmed
a decision of the German Supreme Court (BGH),3 46 in which it was
highlighted that it does not matter that research is also pursued for
commercial reasons.347 The courts clarified, however, that any
commercial exploitation of an end product is not covered by the
research exemption. For this purpose, licenses still have to be
obtained at a later stage. 348  The blocking situation and exorbitant
licenses thus remain an issue. Since decisions about starting research
and development are often made dependent on later commercial
application, the prospect of exorbitant licenses may have prohibitive
impacts on beginning research that would have actually been covered
by the exemption. This correlation diminishes the efficiency of the
European research exemptions significantly, although they are not as
narrowly construed as the U.S. research exemptions.
3. Disadvantages of the European Compulsory Licensing
Models
The European licensing systems must also be criticized in
several respects.
344. See Goddar, supra note 333, at 13. In Sweden and the U.K., experimental use
provisions are read quite narrowly; e.g., clinical trials are not covered. Id.
345. BVerfG [German Federal Constitutional Court], supra note 334, at 43.
346. BGH [German Supreme Court], supra note 333, at 109.
347. Id. at 113 (following the decision of the U.K. Court of Appeal in Monsanto v. Stauffer
Chemical Co., GRUR Int. 1987, 108, 110 (June 11, 1985); BverfG [German Federal
Constitutional Court], supra note 334, at 44; see also BGH [German Supreme Court], supra
note 333, at 111 (allowing defendants to invoke the research exemption for the production of
their pharmaceutical for which they used a polypeptide that had interferon-gamma features
comprising an amino acid sequence that was covered by the claimed patent).
348. See BverfG [German Federal Constitutional Court], supra note 334, at 115; see also
German Draft to Implement the Directive, supra note 16, at 11.
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a. General Arguments Against Compulsory Licenses-
Market Interventions
All European licensing schemes rely on regulatory enforcement
by agencies or courts. 3 49 The value of patents thus, is assessed by
regulatory bodies. This is difficult to reconcile with the principle of
intellectual property that functions as a freely marketable asset.
350
b. Particular Drawbacks of the European Licensing
Provisions
The European proposals present additional specific
shortcomings, as discussed below.
i. Particular Drawbacks of the Directive's
System
Beginning with the Directive, it is particularly important to
criticize the provision for compulsory licenses only for plant patents
and breeders for public interest. 351 Broad access rights cannot be
based on such a narrow system.
ii. Particular Drawbacks of the German Draft's
System
Unlike the Directive, the German Draft provides a compulsory
license model that covers all biotechnology inventions. The Draft
states that the "public interest" requirement shall be abandoned in
German law. However, reception of a compulsory license remains
coupled to the making of an "important technical progress of
considerable economic importance. 352 The term "important technical
process of considerable importance" was read very narrowly in the
past.353  The Draft adheres to this narrow construction. 354  It thus
349. See also infra Part IV.B.4.
350. See Directive, supra note 15, at 19.
351. See Directive, supra note 15, at 15, 19. The scope of compulsory licensing might be
extended to drugs in the course of the WTO decision from August 30, 2003. But such legislation
will not broaden access rights for follow-on research, since the WTO decision is solely directed
to allow the export of drugs to Third World countries which are manufactured under compulsory
licenses. See WTO General Council, Decision, Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres03_e/pr350_e.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
352. § 24 II Nr. 2 PatG, available at
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/GESAMT index.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2004)
353. Koopman, supra note 18, at 188-89.
354. See German Draft to Implement the Directive, supra note 16, at 13.
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assumes that German courts will continue to impose compulsory
licenses only in rare circumstances.355 Therefore, it is doubtful that
the compulsory licensing system of the German Draft will be
successful in giving enough access to patented biotechnology
inventions.
iii. Particular Drawbacks of the System of the
Community Patent
Compared to the German Draft, and the Directive, the Proposal
for a Regulation on the Community patent provides the most detailed
description of a compulsory licensing system. The process to obtain a
license and licensing conditions are illustrated precisely. Again,
however, compulsory licenses are authorized only when the use of the
patented invention involves an "important advance of considerable
economic significance in relation to the invention claimed in the first
patent".356
Further, a license is conditioned on prior efforts to obtain
authorization from the patent holder.357 This means that a researcher
who seeks a license cannot start exploiting the patent invention
immediately. Rather, he has to first enter into negotiations with the
patent holder. Only if those have failed, he can-after a "reasonable
period of time"-request a compulsory license from the European
Commission. This process is subject to criticism in several respects.
First, the term "reasonable period of time" is not defined. Second, the
European Commission is not compelled to decide within a specific
time frame. In antitrust cases, whose complexity may be comparable
to biotechnology patent cases, the Commission needs at least six
months to decide whether there is an exception for a cartel in accord
with Article 85 E.C.358 In complicated cases, the Commission even
needs years to decide. The whole process of applying and obtaining a
compulsory license thus may take an unduly long time, without any
355. Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ][Supreme Court] 3,
190 (192-25) (F.R.G) (denying compulsory license because there was not sufficient proof only
the recombinant drug at issue allowed successful or better treatment).
356. Proposal for a Regulation on the Community Patent, supra note 17, at 47, art. 22 nr.
2.
357. id. at 47, art. 22 nr. 5.
358. Walter Brugger, Vorlesung 330.021 im Sommersemester 2004, Unternehmensrecht
mit Schwerpunkt Wettbewerbsrecht [Script Summer 2004, Cooperation and Competition law],
at I. 1. (2004), available at
http://www.dbj.at/VorlesungBrugger2004-Dateien/viertedoppelstunde.htm (last visited Apr. 30,
2004).
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possibility for applicants to apply for an expedited decision. Since
time is a crucial factor in biotechnological research, this may have
adverse impacts on follow-on research. A subsequent innovator may
forego conducting research, or relocate the project to a country where
no patent protection precludes the use of the invention, rather than
apply for a compulsory license.
4. Conclusion: Adopting Experimental Use Provisions
and/or Compulsory Licensing to Ensure Access?
The conclusion that can be drawn from the European
experimental use exceptions and compulsory licensing systems is
two-fold. The proposed solutions pursue a laudatory goal by trying to
approach the problem of access to patented inventions on a statutory
basis. Explicitly defined access rights could lessen the tension
surrounding biotechnology patent law, which researchers in
universities and biotechnology firms currently face. Beyond that,
explicit provisions could provide legal certainty and further incentives
to carry out new inventions because it would allow research and
development to be done without long delay and without crushing
costs. The construction of any European model must be questioned,
however. The experimental use provisions, on which the German
Draft and the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community
Patent rely, codify a legitimate intent, as they want to honor non-
profit research as "fair use." Yet, it is to doubtful that such provisions
will be a workable tool in granting balanced patent protection in daily
patent practice. 359 As mentioned above, experimental use provisions
tend to be construed too narrowly.360  This problem could be
overcome if legislatures broaden the parameters of experimental
use. 3 6 1 Experimental use could be explicitly extended to allow not
only tests on functionality, but also otherwise infringing commercial
use of biotechnology patents. Experimental use provisions, however,
remain all or nothing solutions, giving a patent holder no reward for
362the use of his invention. The extension of experimental use
provisions to the use of biotechnology invention for downstream
research is especially problematic among scientists and scholars.363
So far, it is asserted that if follow-on research yielded no infringing
359. But see Gitter, supra note 7, at 1679, 1684-90.
360. See infra Part V.A., B.2.
361. See, e.g., Walsh et. al., supra note 114, at 53; Gitter, supra note 7, at 1684-90.
362. See Gitter, supra note 7, at 1679, 1684 n.394.
363. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 112, at 36.
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process or product, because the subsequent inventors found ways to
get around infringing, a broad exemption would significantly harm
initial innovators. 364 It is said that the value of the initial invention
would be destroyed,365 and new investments would be discouraged.366
Thus, broadened experimental use provisions could have detrimental
consequences for the pace of innovation, deeming them inappropriate
to resolutions to the probable drawbacks of patenting.
However, one can argue that broad fair use provisions work
quite effectively in copyright law, without slowing down investments.
U.S. law, Title 17, Section 107,367 gives access to copyrighted subject
matter for "fair" uses, including uses protected under the First
Amendment, like criticism, comment, news reporting, and also
research. The doctrine is drafted to overcome market failures that
would otherwise prevent socially beneficial uses of the protected
work.368 Copyright infringers can claim fair use especially when they
have transformed the copyrighted material.3 69  Users of patented
biotechnology inventions often improve the patented invention or
they develop a marketable product based on the invention. Therefore,
they are doing socially desirable work in the sense of "fair use." It
thus could be argued that fair use provisions are appropriate for
biotechnology research. 370 Biotechnology patent protection could be
changed into "nonexclusive copyright-like protection," which allows
independent development for free.37 ' But, there remain core
differences between copyright law and biotechnology patent law that
advocate against such analogy. The exploitation of copyrighted
material in fair use cases is mostly limited in scope and in purpose;
fair use provisions are not invoked in every case. The question
whether a patent can be used by other researchers, however, arises in
every single biotechnology patent case. Further, biotechnology
research is more expensive than the creation of nonfunctional
364. Id. at 37.
365. Derzko, supra note 301, at 389.
366. See supra notes 61-68.
367. See the parallel provision in §§ 44a-52a UrhG [German Copyright Law], available at
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/index.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
368. O'Rourke, supra note 308, at 1180.
369. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
370. Gitter, supra note 7, at 1679, 1687-90; see also O'Rourke, supra note 316, at 1177;
cf Steven J. Grossman, Experimental Use or Fair Use as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 30
IDEA 243, 243-44 (1990) (arguing not for a separate fair use defense as such, but proposing that
patent courts consider fair use criteria in infringement cases).
371. But see Leibovitz, supra note 80, at 2268-72, 2282-83.
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expressive works.372 Thus, the application of a copyright-like fair use
exemption in biotechnology patent law would not sufficiently reflect
the property rights to biotechnology. 373 Therefore, any proposal to
change the patent system in biotechnology patent law into
"nonexclusive copyright-like protection" without a right to enjoin
independent creation 374 is inappropriate from an innovator's point of
view. Moreover, constitutional arguments militate against application
of "fair use" principles in biotechnology patent law. A wide-reaching
fair use exemption would change the character of patent rights
significantly. A patent right is a property right. It is an exclusive right
to exclude others. Broad access provisions would render this
traditionally strong right a free access right. In Europe, it could be
argued that such a degraded right does not fulfill the constitutional
acceptable minimum standard of property anymore. 375 U.S. law could
contend that broad research exemptions, which allow free use of the
invention, violate the intellectual property clause of the U.S.
Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8. Congress may have the
power to grant less-than-exclusive patent rights.376 However, granting
broad experimental use provisions that promise no return to
investment may go beyond that power.377  Thus, extended
experimental use defenses are not only counteractive to investment
incentives, but also unconstitutional.
Some have suggested that the problems of overly broad research
exemptions can be resolved by limiting research exemptions to non-
378profit institutions,3 8 and to upstream research, which is done on
patented DNA sequences, as opposed to downstream research, which
uses patented DNA sequences. 379  Constitutional problems may
indeed be resolved by narrowed research exemptions. Initial
inventors would be better off economically. However, such
limitations would still fail to create a proper balance, as they would
372. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REv. 99, 152 (2000).
373. Jennifer L. Davis, Comment, The Test of Primary Cloning: An New Approach to the
Written Description Requirement in Biotechnological Patents, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 469,481 (2004).
374. But see Leibovitz, supra note 80, at 2268-72, 2282-3.
375. See BverfG [German Federal Constitutional Court], supra note 334, at 44 (accepting
a broad understanding of research exemptions only under the condition that the patent holder
retains the right to royalties in the instance of commercial success of the subsequent invention).
376. Mueller, supra note 283, at 49.
377. But see id.
378. Cf Gitter, supra note 7, at 1684-90.
379. Seeid. at 1679, 1684n.394.
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not adequately serve the interests of subsequent innovators to have
wide access to inventions. Research on the invention permits testing
how the invention works, but not using the invention for the creation
of new products. Hence, many downstream uses would not be
covered by the exemption. In addition, it would be difficult to
distinguish between researchers examining function and researchers
creating new products in a large number of cases, especially where
the invention is improved. To distinguish between commercial and
non-profit research to promote innovation with a limited exemption is
similarly unpromising. What about universities? They are academic
facilities, traditionally working not-for-profit. But, the role of
universities has changed. Patent rights are increasingly important to
attract further private investment for those who do research with
public funds.38° Universities have become aggressive in enforcing
their intellectual property rights.381 Faculties often have relationships
with venture capital companies, or they are linked to biotechnology
companies. 382 Thus, there is major uncertainty on how to delineate
non-profit and for-profit research. Such uncertainty may have
detrimental impacts on incentives to invest.383 Consequently, whereas
broadened research exemptions are too broad to strike the desired
balance between adequate patent protection and adequate access
rights from a patentee's perspective, limitations on research
exemptions are insufficient from subsequent innovators' perspective.
Whether compulsory licensing can satisfy the interests of
patentees and subsequent inventors is also questionable. Compulsory
licensing is different from experimental use provisions, since it
reasonably recoups the patentee's investments with royalties and/or
cross-licenses, and thus gives incentives to invest.384  Compulsory
licensing is a better model than research exemptions in fighting hold-
ups because it simultaneously grants widespread access. The
European solutions are not properly designed, however, to avoid
negative impacts on patentees' innovation flowing from widespread
compulsory licensing. The singular flaws of each model with regard
to scope of the system, licensing procedures, and eligibility could be
380. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 698.
381. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 301, at 294, 304.
382. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 59,
at 9; see also Sheldon Krimsky, The Profit of Scientific Discovery and Its Normative
Implications, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 29 (1999) (finding in interviews with about two dozen of
the best U.S. molecular biologists that all were working in some way for business).
383. Hill, supra note 83, at 254-55.
384. Cf Koopman, supra note 18, at 199; see also Yosick, supra note 281, at 1304.
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fixed rather easily by slightly modifying the respective structures. As
a 2003 case study revealed, compulsory licensing may discourage
investments when it is based on regulatory interventions, when it
occurs predictably, and when it covers major market segments.38 5
The reason for such possible chilling effects is that patents are
assessed and licensed by courts or agencies. From a legal point of
view, one could justify such regulatory interventions with the public
interest in ongoing follow-on research, public health, and job growth
in the biotechnology industry.386 Further, one may argue that
acceptance is just a welcomed side effect of, not a determinative
factor for, imposing a compulsory license system in biotechnology
patent law. Yet, a patentee's trust in the patent system is crucial,
since trust is the key to encourage investments, and to ultimately
achieve the overall result of steady innovation.
Particularly in the United States, a compulsory licensing system
based on regulatory interventions might be vigorously opposed.
387
The United States has an extreme aversion toward regulatory
restraints on patent holders.388 Compulsory licensing has been
considered in environmental laws such as the Atomic Energy Act
389
and the Clean Air Act.390  Although extensively discussed in the
context of 9/11 as a means to get enough serum in case of an anthrax
attack, compulsory licensing was never enacted.391 Courts have
recognized "reasonable" compulsory licenses in patent infringement
385. Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. & L.J. 853, 879-907
(2003).
386. See Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ][Supreme
Court], supra note 355, at 193 (public health); see also Matthew S. Bethards, Condemning a
Patent: Taking Intellectual Property by Eminent Domain, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 81, 107-14 (2004)
(discussing innovation and growth of the industry); Gitter, supra note 7, at 1682 (declaring
innovation relating to human DNA sequences as essential for the public welfare as clean air);
see also Reinhardt Schuster & Clemens Rubel, Biotech Risks of Compulsory Licensing, 127
MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 47-49 (Mar. 2003).
387. NUFFIELD COUNCIL OF BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at 55.
388. See W. R. Cornish, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks andAllied
Rights 291 (4th ed. 1999); see also Gitter, supra note 7, at 1681; NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, supra note 118, at 93.
389. 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2004).
390. 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2004).
391. See Grace K. Advedissian, Global Implications of a Potential U.S. Policy Shift
Toward Compulsory Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New Era of "Super-Terrorism" 18
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 237 (2002) (providing a good overview of the problem).
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392
cases as a means to award damages instead of an injunction.
Further, compulsory licenses have been a remedy in cases of patent
misuse and antitrust violations in the area of biotechnology.
393
However, widespread statutory compulsory licensing that results in
collective governmental or judicial valuation 394 of biotechnology
patents is unlikely to be promulgated in the United States. 395 These
findings though, do not compel abandonment of compulsory licensing
to create a balanced patent system. 396  What is necessary to
successfully implement a compulsory licensing system in European
and in U.S. patent law is the replacement of a regulatory approach
with a contractual approach.
V. PROPOSAL FOR MODIFYING TRADITIONAL COMPULSORY
LICENSING SCHEMES
A. Substituting the Regulatory Nature of Compulsory Licensing
1. Patent Pooling as a Market-Based Solution to Grant
Access
Patent pooling might be a suitable tool to eliminate the
regulatory character of compulsory licensing because of continued
reliance on the prospects of licensing on reasonable terms. Robert P.
Merges was one of the first who strongly proposed pooling in patent
law as a natural model to defeat blocking situations.3 97 In 2000, the
USPTO published a white paper in which it recommended patent
pooling in the field of biotechnology as a solution to grant sufficient
access to biotechnology inventions.398
392. See, e.g., SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1354
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (overruling the District Court's grant of $18 million because the patent was
invalid); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, supra note 43, at 3.
393. Bethards, supra note 386, at 105 n. 100.
394. Merges, supra note 295, at 1307-08.
395. See Epstein, supra note 73, at 3, 24; see also supra Derzko note 309, at 408.
396. See WESTERLUND, supra note 53, at 340 (2002) (stating that the compulsory license
system, used correctly, is an excellent tool for the purpose of balancing interests).
397.Merges, supra note 295, at 1340-93.
398. JEANNE CLARK ET AL., PATENT POOLS: A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? 7-8 (Dec. 5, 2000), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2004); see
also Derzko, supra note 309, at 402; Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing
Commercial Incentives with Health Needs, 2 HOuS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 65, 101-03 (2002).
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Patent pooling allows general patenting. It is based on a
collective contractual framework of pool members. Pool members
are required to license all their patents covering the field of use to the
pool.399  A pool committee administers the patents and makes
decisions about licensing requests. Once a patent is licensed into the
pool, pool members can use patents of other members for a fixed
fee.400 The individual patentee loses his right to individually control
the license. In this regard, sharing patents in a patent pool is similar
to compulsory licensing. But, patent pooling relies on the deliberate
participation of patent holders. Theoretically, patent pooling is an
appealing method to ensure access to patented inventions.
Macroeconomically, pooling is in the best interest of society because
licensing transactions are burdensome and costly.40 The Department
of Justice and FTC have recognized patent pooling as pro-
competitive.40 2  Thus, patent pools may also survive antitrust
scrutiny.4 °3  One may doubt, however, whether deliberate
participation can occur in an area that relies so heavily on the
financial exploitation of inventions such as biotechnology.
Particularly, firms are inherently driven to think on a microeconomic
level, rather than on a macroeconomic. Their main purpose is not the
appropriate allocation of research tools in the best interest of society
at large, but making profits. As stated by lain Cockburn, an
economist at Boston University: "'The nature of the biotechnology
industry is the potential cause of some problems. There are a lot of
small, hungry companies out there whose only asset is intellectual
property. ' A4  Of particular concern are patents that are "rival-in-
405
use," that is, patents which reduce others' profits from use. From
the stand point of a single firm, a protectionist approach might be
strategically preferable although patent pooling would be in the
overall economic interest. Additionally, firms tend to systematically
overvalue their patent rights, which makes setting uniform license
399. Merges, supra note 295, at 1341.
400. Id. at 1307-08.
401. JEANNE CLARK ET AL., supra note 398, at 9.
402. Joel I. Klein, Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law, Address Before the American
Intellectual Property Association (May 2, 1997), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1123.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2004); cf also FED.
TRADE COMM'N, supra note 112, Ch. 6, pp. 2-3.
403. Derzko, supra note 309, at 402. But see Gitter, supra note 7, at 1679; see also Heller
& Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 700.
404. See Gitter, supra note 7, at 1681.
405. Walsh et al., supra note 114, at 50.
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fees among all pool members difficult.40 6  Hence, absent any
obligation to share inventions, patentees might refuse to do so, at least
on reasonable terms.4°7 Thus, whereas patent pooling might be
promising in other industries, it is not in the biotechnology
industry.40 8 Rather, what is necessary is a system that combines the
market based idea of pooling with the legal obligation to share within
a state enforced compulsory licensing system.
2. Arbitration as a Market-Based Solution to Grant Access
Arbitration, compelled by statutory law, could bridge the gap
between sufficient legal enforcement and adherence to business rules.
Arbitration is a type of dispute resolution in which disputing parties
choose an arbiter to render a final and binding decision on the merits
of the controversy.40 9  Combining the benefits of compulsory
licensing with arbitration would result in a statutorily enforced
arbitration-based compulsory license system. A similar system is
already in force in the music recording industry to determine
appropriate royalties. In 1976, Congress replaced the quasi-
administrative agency that had determined royalties with ad hoc
arbitration royalty panels. 410 The panels were enacted to respond to
the needs of industry members who complained about the rulings of
the administration.4 1 In this system, the panel's purpose is limited to
the determination of a reasonable licensing fee. The state retains
large enforcement power, since the Librarian of Congress appoints
412panel members, and has the right to overrule panel decisions.Provided that such an arbitration-based system was extended to the
406. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 701; Henrik Holzapfel, OECD-Workshop
zum Thema "Genetische Erfindungen und Patentrecht " am 24. and 25. Januar 2002 in Berlin
[OECD- Workshop "Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices"
on January 24. and 25., 2002 at Berlin], GRUR INT. 434,438 (2002) (referring to a statement of
Laurence Horn, Vice President of MPEG LA).
407. See Gitter, supra note 7, at 1680; see also Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 699-
701; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 217-18 (1987); O'Rourke, supra note 3 16, at 1245.
408. O'Rourke, supra note 316, at 1180; see also Bradley J. Levang, Comment, Evaluating
the Use of Patent Pools for Biotechnology: A Refutation to the USPTO White Paper Concerning
Biotechnology Patent Pools, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH. TECH. L.J. 229, 240-51
(2002).
409. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 382 (2002) (quoting 1. MACNEIL
ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 2.1.1 (1995) and the Unif. Arbitration Act § 5, 7 U.L.A.
173 (1997).
410. 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-803 (2004).
411. See Merges, supra note 295, at 1311.
412. 17 U.S.C. §§ 801(a), 802(f).
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entire licensing process and was more privatized, it could successfully
provide access to patented biotechnology inventions. Such a system
could become more privatized through reduction of regulatory
interventions. The state should only create the basis for compulsory
licensing by explicit amendment of its patent act, including provisions
about eligibility, licensing procedures, and a rudimentary framework
about how to measure and to set licenses. But authorization of
licenses, including determination of content and license fees, should
exclusively lie in the hands of the arbitration panel, which is privately
composed of the patentee and the prospective licensee. Since
arbitration is rooted in contract law, privatization in patent
transactions would most likely be respected. As the system would
be-aside from its foundation-self-regulating, it would be more
responsive to the interests of patent holders than a traditional state-
enforced compulsory license system. Extension of the system to the
entire licensing process would ensure that all issues that are generally
a part of a contractual license are also considered in a compulsory
license. This way, the concern that parties are confined to strict
legislative defaults413 could be dealt with when compulsory licenses
are authorized. Flexible licensing provisions would be feasible, so
that licenses could be sustained in the long run. The remainder of this
article will describe how to best put the system into effect.
Composition of the arbitration panel will be discussed, as well as
eligibility, procedural issues to get a license, determination of a
reasonable license fee, and the best mode for payment of royalties.
B. Composition of the Arbitration Panel
The legislature should provide by statutory law that arbitration
panels have to be established whenever necessary to authorize
compulsory licenses to patented inventions. The panel's obligation
should be defined as the duty to determine content and scope of the
license in a compulsory licensing agreement. The legislature should
clarify that panels should be constituted of a representative cross-
section of the biotechnology industry. Members should be
representatives of the industry, such as CEOs, or in-house counsels,
and researchers, who are working in the industry, in universities, and
in other non-profit institutions. Panel members should be appointed
by the parties to the suit, the patent holder and the prospective
licensee. Each party should have the right to name an equal number
413. See Epstein, supra note 73, at 32.
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of members. Additionally, one neutral member should be chosen by
both sides after consent. Decisions should require a majority vote.
After some time, biotechnology communities may contemplate
establishing a permanent panel, a patent clearinghouse, that is
appointed for more than one case by biotechnology industry
organizations and researcher associations.414 Such a clearinghouse
would reduce panel litigation costs. Further, it would address the
problem that multiple licenses may have to be obtained before a
research project can be conducted; in such an instance, the
clearinghouse could decide all licensing questions in one opinion.
Costs of the panel should preferably be borne by the patentee.
One could counter argue that the prospective licensee should bear the
burden of costs. This, however, might prevent a subsequent innovator
from applying for a license. Splitting costs could have a similar
chilling impact on further research. Compelling the patentee to pay
the expenses of the panel is also not unfair. Compulsory licenses
covering future uses and variants are the counterbalance in a system
that grants broad patent protection for biotechnology inventions.
Hence, the panel costs are merely the quid pro quo for the enhanced
possibility of patentees to recoup research and development expenses.
An additional positive effect of payment by patentees would be that
they would be pressured to grant reasonable licenses on a contractual
basis. To prevent panel costs from outweighing the benefits of broad
patenting and to prevent larger companies that seek a license from
using the threat of excessive panel fees to get a patentee to give more
than normal, the legislature should set up fixed and moderate panel
fees.
C. Entitlement For A License
To allow access to licenses, it is critical to define the purposes
for which purpose a compulsory license can be requested.
1. No Limitation to an "Important Technical Progress"
The European provisions authorize compulsory licenses only
when the prospective licensee can prove that the use of the invention
is for an "important technical process of considerable importance.
'4 t 5
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics similarly suggests invoking
414. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note
45, at 23; see also Henrik Holzapfel, supra note 406, at 438 (referring to a statement of Jeffrey
Kushan).
415. Proposal for a Regulation of the Community Patent, supra note 17, at 47.
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compulsory licensing merely "in those cases in which the existence of
a monopoly is creating an unacceptable and unfair situation."'
4 6
German case law shows, however, that compulsory licenses are
hardly granted by reliance on such limiting terms.4 17 In fact, requiring
overwhelming proof of the importance of subsequent invention is
likely to result in compulsory licenses only for ground-breaking
inventions. Research on a drug applicable in HIV treatment and
fundamental research on the human genome might be considered of
significant importance. The production of a drug, or development of
tests which are less comprehensive, but more cost-effective, might not
pass the important progress hurdle. Applying the importance of the
invention requirement to licensing may create the problem of only
granting compulsory licenses to fundamental upstream research for
non-profit use, despite the importance of downstream development
like drug discovery. Particularly in the pharmaceutical field basic
knowledge of genes, proteins, and associated biochemical pathways
must be available at a reasonable price to prevent the problem of
exorbitant royalties and license stacking, which could have
tremendous negative effects on health care costs. 4 18 It has also been
noted that the value of subsequent research might be difficult to
estimate at the early stage, when the license is requested. It may be
hard to tell whether a use will lead to significant improvements.41 9
The consequence could be that compulsory licenses would be denied
unjustifiably. To avoid such an outcome and to foster upstream and
downstream research most effectively, legislatures should thus set
aside the "importance of use" requirement for compulsory licenses.
Rather, a widespread compulsory licensing system should be
promulgated that entitles the arbitration panel to grant licenses for any
DNA related invention to any and all researchers, regardless of
whether research or development is for commercial or for non-profit
purposes.42° Only in obvious cases of misuse, where no intent to use
can be credibly stated, should a license be denied at the outset. This
does not mean that the significance of an invention, and social need
for a compulsory license, are not critical factors. They remain
important by determining reasonableness of royalties; there, however,
416. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at 55.
417. See infra Part IV.B.3.b.bb.; see also Koopman, supra note 18, at 204 n.441.
418. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 701.
419. Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 1076.
420. Cf. Mueller, supra note 283, at 56.
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consideration is possible on more flexible grounds without impeding
subsequent research.42'
Widespread compulsory licensing would also satisfy the interests
of patentees.422 Patentees might be awarded fewer royalty fees in a
single case than when licensing occurs on a contractual basis.
Significant erosion of patentees' willingness to invest in research and
development must not be feared, however, because lesser fees in one
case are outweighed by the right to exploit the invention in its entire
breadth.423 Admittedly, strategic considerations may not be pursuable
to the same extent when compulsory licensing is the standard. It has
to be considered, though, that the role of a patentee can change; she
may need a license in another case. Here, she will directly benefit
from widespread licensing which eases the award of a license.
It might be contended, however, that widespread compulsory
licensing could lead to permanent panel litigation, which is
burdensome for the economy and innovation. It is unrealistic, though,
that each licensing case will require a panel decision. Rather, the
mere existence of the model will encourage voluntary licensing.424
Parties will opt to negotiate contractual licenses because they want to
avoid panel fees as transaction costs, and administrative efforts to set
up a panel. Panel litigation will be particularly unlikely when a panel
has already authorized a compulsory license against a patent holder.
A license would create a kind of precedent for subsequent license
requests in the same field, and, in particular, with regard to the same
invention.
One may nonetheless argue that widespread compulsory
licensing in return for broad patenting should not be proposed because
licensing costs increase prizes. To protect consumers, one may
therefore recommend that patent scope should be narrowed to escape
royalties. However, such argumentation would not reflect
sufficiently, the procompetitive effects of royalties paid in a
compulsory licensing system. First, royalties are kept on reasonable
terms, and are not excessive cost drivers. Second, widespread
royalties establish a continuing revenue stream that ensures further
investments in research and development. The consumer will benefit
from such investments in the long-run because new inventions will be
421. Infra Part IV.B.4.
422. Gitter, supra note 7, at 1679.
423. But see Nott, supra note 195, at 351; see also NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS,
supra note 10, at 55,
424. See Mueller, supra note 283, at 66; Schuster & Rubel, supra note 386, at 47-49.
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yielded which improve health and enhance the quality of life. Given
these set of facts, legislatures should thus tailor a compulsory
licensing system without relying on the importance of subsequent
research.
2. Process to Get a License
According to the European propositions, the subsequent
innovator must have failed in obtaining a contractual license before he
can apply for a compulsory license.425 In general, it must be
appreciated that a compulsory license system requires such pre-use
negotiation proceedings. This way it is adhered to the contractual
nature of patent law and the principle of free trade that is the
cornerstone to preserve investments in biotechnological research.
Furthermore, pre-use negotiations are relied on to comply with Article
31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement. Some have argued, though, that only
a written notice should be required.426 To ensure notification,
damages should be imposed in the case of violation.427 It was
reasoned that eliminating pre-use license negotiations would foster
innovation.428 Follow-on research might indeed be motivated when a
prospective licensee can start research immediately-just after
informal notification of the patentee. The position of patent holders,
on the other hand, would be significantly weakened without pre-use
negotiations since the licensing process would be put completely out
of a patent holders' control. To fully preserve their interests,
patentees would need to start burdensome investigations on the extent
of their patent use.429  Since trade secret law largely shields
companies from disclosing research purposes and results, obtaining
comprehensive knowledge about the use of patents might be futile.
For compulsory licensing to be fair and well-balanced, it must adhere
to reasonable pre-use negotiations.
Yet to prevent long delay, such negotiations should be limited in
time. The legislature should specify how long a licensee must
reasonably try to receive a contractual license before he can initiate a
panel proceeding. Most notably, outer limits should be defined. To
do so, the legislature should establish a biotechnology committee,
425. See infra Part IV,B.1., 3.
426. Gitter, supra note 7, at 1683; see also Mueller, supra note 283, at 58-59.
427. Mueller, supra note 283, at 59.
428. See Gitter, supra note 7, at 1683.
429. See Epstein, supra note 73, at 30.
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which sets forth a catalogue of factors to define reasonableness, and
which periodically provides specific time data.
D. Determination of Reasonableness
The legislature should determine that the arbitration panel grants
the "license on reasonable terms., 430  In defining "reasonable," the
economic value of a license is the foremost consideration. Further,
"any need to correct an anti-competitive practice" should be examined
and assessed. Moreover, the purpose for which the license is sought
should be evaluated under public policy considerations. The
legislature should declare explicitly that the more essential the
invention for further research, the higher the public interest, the more
"non-rival-in-use" the invention, and the higher the non-commercial
interest to conduct research, the lesser the license fee will be. Here,
the importance of the subsequent use comes in play. Necessary
access to research tools, for example, would result in awarding the
patentee with only a small fee.431 This would resolve the problem of
royalty stacking, as a licensee who needs multiple patented research
tools must not fear excessive licensing costs. Research tool patentees
would therefore not be hampered, as they would be entitled to
royalties from a large number of licensees.
In determining a "reasonable" license, the panel should rely on
its knowledge of the research area. A fixed fee or a statutory formula
is not appropriate, as biotechnology inventions and their uses are too
indifferent.432  Based on information from researchers, royalties for
research tools between 1 to 5% could be considered small. Similarly,
a fee ranging from $10,000 to $200,000 for particular technologies
such as using a gene for screening, or using microarrays is regarded
as acceptable. By contrast, royalties 10% or higher are deemed to be
"high" or "'ridiculous.,A33 Such data434 could also be used to develop
tariffs for reasonable royalties. A committee of biotechnology
organizations and researcher associations may be asked to make
430. Article 12 of the Directive; § 24 11, V PatG, available at
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/GESAMT-index.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
431. Cf Stimson, supra note 43 (arguing for special consideration of research tools in
granting royalties as damages for infringement of research tool patents).
432. But cf Mueller, supra note 283, at 65 (proposing payment of a royalty of 25 % of the
licensee's pre-tax profit rate on the sale of his invention, which may be "fine-tuned" as
necessary to the circumstances in each case).
433. See Walsh et al., supra note 114, at 16.
434. See also Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463
(1995) (exploring patent behaviors of419 new biotechnology firms).
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suggestions. Such a committee could be authorized by legislatures
upon statutory enactment. This may lead to streamlined standard
setting, although exact licensing scales might be infeasible.
E. Payment of Royalties
Another important issue in this context is how legislatures
should make license fees payable, up-front or after-the-fact. As a
general rule, royalties must sufficiently compensate the patentee,
without hindering the prospective licensee in doing follow-on
research.
Some have suggested that compulsory licenses should be shaped
solely as after-the-fact reach-through royalties.435 This would make
the patentee very dependent on the success of the subsequent
innovation. It has not been sufficiently considered that patentees need
at least some certain and immediate income to recoup research and
development costs. Particularly, start-ups with limited funds rely on
early revenue payments. Thus, a pure reach-through royalty system
would not fulfill the legitimate interests of patentees. The idea of
mere up-front licenses is similarly inappropriate to make compulsory
licensing efficient.436 If the full amount of royalties were to be paid
up-front, before any valuable invention is yielded, research projects
could be inhibited. To overcome these problems, royalties should be
imposed in combination with up-front and reach-through royalties
since this would sufficiently reimburse the patentee by ensuring
follow-on research of subsequent innovators without considerable
impediments. In detail, payment of license fees should be as follows:
as above, license fees should be "reasonable," balancing economic
value of the patented invention and policy considerations. A fixed fee
thereof should be set up-front (ex ante), after assessing policy issues
like the importance of subsequent research for healthcare. Up-front
licenses would thus be kept small. Full payment of the amount of
reasonable royalties would be deferred until subsequent research had
yielded marketable results. The arbitration panel should ensure such
ex-post payments by setting a specific payoff from estimated sales in
the initial compulsory license agreement. In addition, the panel
should impose a duty on the licensee to inform the patent holder of
435. See e.g. Gitter, supra note 7, at 1683; see also Janice M. Mueller, supra note 283, at
51 n.253, 54-66.
436. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 699 (arguing that payments which include
not reach-through obligations increase the upfront cost of a license, but decrease the likelihood
of an anticommons emerging); see also Merz et al., supra note 70, at 579.
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any valuable result which the use of the invention has yielded. As a
substitute, particularly when the licensee does not exploit the
subsequent invention sufficiently, the patentee may opt for a cross-
license.
VI. CONCLUSION
Patent communities have long been pressured to define the limits
of biotechnology inventions properly. They certainly will be in the
future. This thesis showed a way that patent communities could
resolve the central difficulty to promote innovation in biotechnology
without stifling further research. The proposal for compulsory
licensing based on arbitration would allow patent offices and courts to
grant broad patent protection for inventions. Applying the more
lenient enabling disclosure standard, which exists in European
biotechnology patent law, is a significant inventive stretch. Patents
comprising DNA homologues, protein variants, and probable uses of
DNA-related subject matter, including patents on research tools,
would be the rule, rather than the exception. This would create the
necessary incentives for initial innovators to invest in costly
biotechnological research. Further research would not be stifled
because widespread compulsory licensing would provide the
counterbalance to grant access to patented inventions on reasonable
terms. Research could flow without significant costs or considerable
delay, by foregoing any threshold requirement to receive a license, by
allowing licenses for non-profit and for-profit uses, for upstream and
downstream research, by ensuring fast licensing procedures, and by
deferring payments of the full amount of "reasonable" licenses,
despite a small up-front fee, to the time the use of patented inventions
yields valuable results. The patentee, on the other hand, could
simultaneously reap the fruits of her invention. If licensing was
additionally coupled with arbitration as an enforcement tool, rather
than the traditional regulatory enforcement, compulsory licensing
would also harmonize with the principles of free trade and would
respond properly to the peculiarities of licensing in biotechnology
patent law. An arbitration based compulsory licensing system would
thus adequately adjust patent law in the field of biotechnology, so that
patenting can achieve what it accomplished until now-innovation.
